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ABSTRACT 
Sudan has a rich but bloody history. Slavery, two civil wars, insurgencies, widespread 
famines and chilling human rights abuse have been woven into the very fabric of the 
nation's psyche. 
Deep religious faith - whether Islamic, Christian or traditional beliefs - has not been able 
to draw the nation together, to encourage people to treat each other as equals. 
Rather, racist beliefs and attitudes have become a common theme in dealings between the 
different ethnic groups of Sudan. While the original divide was between northerners and 
southerners, Muslims and everyone else, new cleavages are forming between Sudanese 
Africans and the ruling Sudanese Arab elite. People from the north, south, east and west 
are being encouraged to find a common bond as Africans. 
The African Sudanese may be Muslims, Christians or followers or traditional noble 
beliefs. They may be from the left, the right, of no political persuasion or religious 
adherence. 
As a group, they are taking a leaf out of the book of the Sudan Peoples Liberation 
Movement and using its language to describe their Sudanese identities. But in the long 
run, calling some people Sudanese Arabs and defining them as the enemy is not an 
antidote to the poison of racism that has troubled Africa's largest country for so long. 
This sub-thesis looks at the history of Sudan and the way in which it has been shaped by 
religion, by colonialism and most of all by the multiple identities of the country. It looks 
at Sudan before and after independence and at the wars that have cost so many lives. 
It notes the missed opportunities to mould the nation into a workable whole and the way 
race has been used to sour relations between north and south. It looks at the resolution of 
the second civil war, the continuing conflict in Darftir and to the future in a new Sudan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For 21 years, the war in southern and central Sudan has been described in the media as a 
conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian and animist south. 
But when separate fighting broke out in the west of the country escalated in February 
2003, it was referred to as a conflict between Arab tribes and black Africans. Sometimes 
there is reference made to the fact that both groups are Muslims. 
The conflict in the west is consistently referred to as genocide, whereas the conflict in 
southem and central Sudan is more usually described as a religious war. However, the 
conflicts in Sudan can all be linked to multiple identities and racism. 
The sub-thesis looks at identity in Sudan and how it has affected the way the country has 
developed. In essence, it is about racism - the racism of the slave traders, the racism of 
the British colonialists, how race influences the way Sudanese from different parts of the 
country relate to each other. It looks at race and the rise of nationalism in Sudan and the 
obstacles to developing a cohesive national identity. 
United Nations special envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk, has described the country as "a failed 
nation ... many nations together in one huge territory, held together by force" 
(Associated Press February 14, 2005). There is a lot of truth in what he says. In Sudan, 
one is part of a tribal or regional group whether one likes it or not and this affects all 
relationships - femily, politics, business, education. The dominant Arab Muslim north 
has been able to control resources and power in the country, to the detriment of Sudan's 
peacefril development as a nation. 
In the past Sudan was typically divided into north and south, with the implication that the 
north was Muslun and the south had traditional or Christian beliefs. But further 
cleavages have deepened over time and a number of distinct groupings are now apparent 
- Arab north, Darfurians in the west, Beja in the east, Nuba in central Sudan, Nilotics 
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(Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk) in the south and the Equatorians in the south. Within the Nilotics, 
the Dmka as the largest tribe also form a separate group and within the Dinka, there are 
four sub-groups, with Dinka Bor the dominant group and also the home area of Sudan 
Peoples Liberation Movement leader John Garang. Within the Equatorians, there is also 
a separate group formed by the dominant Bari speakers. 
The first three groups are Muslim, the Nuba are a mix of Muslims/Christians and people 
with traditional beliefs and the southerners are a mix of those with traditional beliefs and 
Christians, with some Muslims as well. 
These different groups identify each other by skin colour and possibly by tribal markings, 
by dress and social behaviour, by area of origin and given names. While on the one hand 
there has been intermarriage across the board, this has generally been a case of southern 
women marrying northem men, rather than vice versa. Although at an individual level, 
people may work and study together, they are far less likely to socialise together. 
Northerners may look down on southerners and call them slaves, southemers may view 
all northemers as bigots. The influence of religion means there are varying social habits, 
especially regarding appropriate dress, mixing between the sexes and use of alcohol. 
On a national level, north and south have been fighting since 1955. A period of peace 
between 1972 and 1983 provided some chance to foster working relations, but this golden 
era did not endure. Instead, there has been constant bloodshed, ethnic cleansing by the 
goverrmient in the south, central and westem Sudan, abduction and slavery, scorched 
earth policy by the goverrmient to strengthen control over oil fields in southern Sudan, 
fighting between other tribal groups such as Dinka and Nuer, and human rights abuses on 
all sides. 
With the signing of the peace deal on January 9, 2005, Sudan has the opportunity to 
create a new and unified country that lives in peace with itself and its neighbours. 
However the years of war and the lack of a cohesive, overarching identity have placed 
Sudan in a very negative light. ]n theoiy, Sudan is as capable of running and working 
well as any other country. But it is not uncommon to hear Sudanese say, albeit in a 
rhetorical sense, that things were better under the British and perhaps they should come 
back. 
But the British don't want to come back, at least not as a colonial power. Further, the aid 
money that has been propping up the civil war for the past 20 years is not flowing so 
freely any more. What is Sudan going to do to achieve a lasting peace? 
In my view, there is no place for religion in politics, if people want the countr\' to stay 
united. However, it is very clear that there is a strong political push to keep sharia as a 
source of national law. Continuing to take this tack is tantamount to taking out a pair of 
scissors and slicing the country in half Islamic law is unacceptable to most southerners 
and indeed to quite a few northerners, there should be no equivocation on this issue. 
Many other issues of importance, such as equal sharing of wealth, access to good jobs 
and political positions and proper infrastructure in regional areas have been dealt w t h 
suflficiently in the peace agreement protocols. It is up to the leaders in appropriate areas 
to make sure employment targets are met. 
If the vexed issues of secular government and inherent racist attitudes are not addressed, 
why would the south want to stay? Two wars have been fought over these problems, 
patience is clearly running thin. 
To explore these matters fiirther, I trace the history of Sudan by looking at the way 
identity has affected the development of the country. I draw on twenty years of 
experience with Sudan and Sudanese people, including fieldwork in Sudan in 2004 and 
interviews with Sudanese here in Australia on my return. I have used a range of English 
language sources, from academic and journalistic works by Sudanese from differing 
ethnic backgrounds, through to academic and journalistic works by long-term and more 
recent Sudan watchers. 
My story starts in the middle of the seventeenth century and touches on the Turko-
Ottoman period, looking at colonialism, the rise of nationalism, independence and the 
two wars. I look at what is happening between the different groups, how they related to 
each other, what opportunities there were for dialogue and the responses of the various 
players. 
I do not provide details of every political grouping and actor, I do not go deeply into the 
workings of the mosques or the particular sects such as the suiis. I do not give a shell-by-
shell description of the war, discuss flows of armaments or the intricacies of the internal 
power struggles within the SPLM or the government. I do not provide a long list of every 
aid agency that has ever worked in Sudan, what they delivered and to whom and at what 
point they had their licence revoked by the government. 
I do investigate the many identities of Sudan and the changing way in which they relate 
to each other. I do explore the ways in which these identities have shaped life in Sudan 
during the past 20 years of war. 
Sudan is inhabited by a myriad of different ethnic groups and their daily lives have been 
painstakingly researched, their customs dissected, physical features photographed, homes 
and way of life documented, from the Nuba in central Sudan, to the Nubian people and 
the Baggara nomads in the north, the southern Nile-dwelling Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer, the 
Bari-speakers and the Uduk in the south, the Beja in the east, the Fur in the west (see 
Baumann 1987; Cunnison 1966; Deng 1972, 1978, 1995, 1998; Evans-Pritchard 1971, 
1940; Hale 1971; Paul 1954). 
For ethnographical detail, such books are invaluable, but they only set the scene for 
discussion of Sudanese identity and its role in the perennial political conflict. 
In researching this sub-thesis, my main sources have been a different group of writers on 
Sudan. Only one author, Francis Deng,' falls into both groups. Deng writes about both 
the intricacies of life among his Ngok Dinka people and wider aspects of politics in 
southern Sudan and Sudan as a whole. Deng's books are helpful for a variety of reasons 
- his topics are interesting and as a well-connected Dinka, his fieldwork is invaluable. 
He is also able to articulate some of the problems and issues to do with identity and 
racism. His stories from varying tribal chiefs and so on provide a wonderful insight into 
the analysis of issues by people of very traditional backgrounds. 
For the same reason, Abel Alier's^ (Alier 1992) book on southern Sudan stands out. 
Alier describes the political history of the area from the point of view of both a 
commentator and a player in major Sudanese events such as the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
His deep understanding of the area and diligent access to historical sources provides a 
great deal of enlightenment on the various power plays in the country's history. 
Bona Malwal's^ (Malwal 1981, 1985, 2004) experience as a journalist and a government 
minister also provides insight into aspects of Sudanese identity. He is able to describe 
what it was like to be doing deals in the upper echelons of power and he is not afraid to 
put forward his opinion, even when it may differ from the views of the day. 
These three authors are all from the south and also all from the Dinka tribe, albeit from 
different sections. Northern authors such as Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed Salih and 
Abdel Salaam Sidahmed (Mohamed Salih 1994, Sidahmed 1996) provide insight into 
aspects of the country, with Sidahmed's work on politics and Islam in Sudan particularly 
useful for shedding light on the machinations of the various players in that arena. 
There are a number of non-Sudanese authors and commentators whose works were 
enlightening in my research. Lesch's (Lesch 1998) work on contested national identities 
' Francis Deng is from the Ngok Dinka of the Abyei area of south Kordofan and is a former government 
minister and ambassador and United Nations special representative for displaced people. 
^ Abel Alier is a lawyer, former Sudanese Vice President and key player in negotiations for the first peace 
agreement in Addis Ababa in 1972. 
^ Bona Malwal is a journalist and former government minister for information and culture. 
had a wealth of information. I found her work both interesting and valuable, but I would 
also argue she did not tackle racism as a multifaceted and entrenched phenomenon. 
Other authors such as Holt and Daly, Woodward, Warburg, Voll and Voll and De Waal 
(Holt & Daly 1979; Woodward 1990, 2004; Warburg 1999, 2005; Voll & Voll 1985; De 
Waal 2001, 2004) focused on historical and/or political issues and were extremely useful 
in this regard and in providing fiirther msight into the role of Islam. With close scrutmy, I 
was able to decipher a subtext on racism and identity. 
Works by Vemey, Ashworth and Lusk^ (Vemey 1995,1999; Ashworth 2004; Lusk 2004) 
were invaluable in news and analysis of current events from the perspective of long-term 
Sudan watchers. Likewise reports from groups such as the International Crisis Group, 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Intemational had a wealth of detail and analysis. 
Other Sudanese authors such as Oduho, Albino, Beshir, Wai and Abd-Al Rahim (Oduho 
& Deng 1963; Albino 1970; Beshir 1975; Wai 1973; Abd-Al Rahim 1986) had usefiil and 
sometimes vital information in the historical context, but were written too long ago to 
cover the most recent civil war. 
The Sudan.Net website was and remains a wonderful source of up-to-date news from a 
variety of news agencies and other sources. 
In my view, focusing on identity and racism as a way for looking at the conflict in Sudan 
may contribute to our understanding of what has been happening in that country. The 
veiy nature of religion and the need for blind belief or faith can make religious 
differences difficult to challenge, but racial prejudice, once identified, can surely be 
defeated. Where there's a will, there's a way. 
The thesis is organised in five chapters. 
' Gillian Lusk is deputy editor of Africa Confidential newsletter in London. 
Chapter One provides a brief history of Sudan, looking at the country's early 
organisation, including sultanates, the Mahdiya period and the role of the slave trade in 
fomenting fear and distrust between the north and the south. 
The advent of colonialism brought new challenges to Sudan's varying ethnic groups, as 
the British sought to separate northerners and southerners and introduced a different 
religion, Christianity, and lingua franca, English, to the south. 
So marked was the gap between the two regions, that northem nationalism failed to 
create a space for southern aspirations in their vision of a modem, independent Sudan. 
At the Juba Conference in 1947 the two parts of the country were stitched together and 
the pattern set for an Arab Muslim dominated govemment for the rest of the century. 
Two civil wars have only served to widen the rift between the two groups, with 
bloodshed and broken promises exacerbated by the central government's reliance on 
Islam as the way forward for the nation. 
Chapter Two looks at Sudan's multiple identities, discussing early nationalist 
movements, the move towards independence and how the Sudanisation of govemment 
positions became seen as northemisation by people from the south. 
It looks at the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the ways the early days of peace were 
used to project a new multicultural image and identity for Sudan. The collapse of the 
agreement and the rise of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement emphasise the 
inability of successive goverrmients to provide a Sudan for all Sudanese. 
Chapter Three looks at the interface between Arabs and Africans in the Sudanese context, 
including the growing identification of some Muslim Sudanese with their African roots. 
Sudan's identification as an Afiican, Arab, Muslim and Islamic nation is reviewed. 
including the role of Islamic scholar and politician Hassan A1 Turabi in developing 
modem Sudanese Islam. 
It investigates the ways in which identity makes some Sudanese more likely to suffer 
during war, including the role of oil and development in displacing southem Sudanese 
from their rural homes and Copts from their urban businesses. It looks at the widespread 
abuse of human rights and resurgence of slavery. It discusses how groups such as 
Nilotics and Equatorians are played off against each other to the advantage of the status 
quo. 
Chapter Four looks at the crisis in Darflir, outlining the history of the area and the 
background to the conflict. It explains how the situation has been inflamed by 
government support for militia groups and details both the concern of international bodies 
and their inability to date to foster a solution. 
Chapter Five covers the signing of the peace agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, while 
recognising that there is continuing bloodshed in Darfiir. It looks at both the aspirations 
and the fears of different Sudanese groups. 
The sub-thesis seeks to establish that Sudan's problems are rooted in racism, rather 
religion alone. It also takes the view that strong and visionary leadership is required if 
north and south, Arabs and Africans, Muslims, Christians and those with 'noble spiritual 
beliefs,'^ are to live together successfully on a basis of friendship and equality. 
' I understand this term was coined by former foreign minister Mansour Khalid for use in the constitution. 
CHAPTER ONE 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUDAN 
Introduction 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Around 35 million people live within its 2.5 
square million kilometres of desert, savannah and forest. They speak more than 100 
languages, including Arabic, English and Dinka. They follow Islam, Christianity and 
noble spiritual beliefs. 
The cultural richness and variety inside the country are echoed in its diverse range of 
neighbours. Sudan shares borders with Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo, 
Central African Republic, Chad and Libya. It belongs to both the African Union and the 
Arab League. Had history treated Sudan more kindly, its size and strategic location could 
have made it a bridge between Arab and African and Islamic and non-Islamic nations 
(Voll & Voll 1985: 143). Instead, plans to become the breadbasket of the Arab world 
(Gurdon 1986: 21, Bamett & Abdelkarim 1988: 4-5) have been tiiwarted by civil 
conflicts, famine and poverty pre-dating independence in 1956 and stretching to the 
present day. 
Nevertheless, the peace agreement signed in Nairobi on January 9, 2005 between the 
Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement marks the end of the 
second, 21-year civil war - at least in the south of the country - and provides the chance 
for the nation to develop anew. The peace agreement addresses long-held grievances 
such as Khartoum-centric distribution of resources and limited employment opportunities 
for people hailing from the south. However, even as ululations ring out across the south, 
solutions are still being sought for the bloodshed in the western area of Darflir. 
Ironically, the much awaited peace deal may mean that Sudan eventually loses its title as 
Africa's largest country. The peace agreement provides for a referendum after six years 
in which southerners can vote either to stay part of Sudan or break away and form a 
separate country. Such a split would have implications for other African nations 
struggling to stay united inside colonially-drawn borders (Gingyera-Pinycwa 1973: 133, 
Russell & McCall 1973: 113-115). 
Nationalism and identity 
Years of civil war culminating in serious discussion of separation indicates some real 
problems in Africa's largest nation. To have reached this situation, should Sudan be 
viewed as a nation at all, or simply a conglomeration of competing groups with different 
customs and ambitions that has proved notoriously difficult to govern? 
Explaining why some groups gel as nations and others do not is not easy, argues 
Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm 1994: 5). He says nationalism can spring from ethnicity or from 
a political framework, but criteria for nationhood may be based on "single factors such as 
language or ethnicity or a combination of criteria such as language, common territory, 
common history, cultural traits" (Hobsbawm 1994: 5). 
The answer to the question: "Who you think you are?" can depend on where you are at 
the time and who you are with. 
It is perfectly possible for a person living in Slough to think of himself, depending on 
circumstances, as, say, a British citizen, or (faced with citizens of a different colour) as an 
Indian, or (faced with other Indians) as a Gujarati, or (faced with Hindus or Muslims) as a 
Jain, or a member of a particular caste, or kinship connection, or as one who, at home, 
speaks Hindi rather than Gujarati, or doubtless in other ways (Hobsbawm 1994: 8). 
Likewise, Sudanese may have multiple identities, describmg themselves as, say, a 
southerner, a Bari-speaker, a Kuku or a Christian, depending on the context. The nature 
of these identities affects every aspect of their lives in Sudan, especially access to 
education and employment. 
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Many Sudanese claim a variety of ancestries: "Individuals can share characteristics with 
more than one group. Fur and Beja see themselves both as African culturally and as 
devout Muslims. Similarly, southemers can use Arabic for commerce without altering 
their self-identity" (Lesch 1998: 210). 
Nevertheless, in Sudan, skin colour and facial features are telltale signs not only of 
background, but also of supposed political allegiances. Even visitors to Sudan soon learn 
to distinguish between northerners and southemers, to identify people by their 
complexion and by tribal markings. Mixed with their first words of Arabic, visitors are 
inevitably taught the word abid- literally meaning slave, but also used as a derogatory 
term for southemers. They discover all Sudanese are not equal, that racism is imbibed 
along with the waters of the Nile. 
There is a clear pecking order among the Sudanese, with some believing they are more 
genuinely Sudanese than others. These 'lesser' Sudanese may be darker in skin colour, 
hail from the south, central or westem Sudan, or have Nigerian or Egyptian ancestry. 
Religion is also a dividing line and the lighter-skinned Copts or Orthodox Christians are 
often described as Egyptian or Greek, no matter how long their families have lived in the 
country. If the Copts and other Christians are seen as outsiders by the Muslim majority, 
those seen as least Sudanese of all are those southemers, westerners and Nuba people 
practising traditional (and therefore inherently Sudanese) beliefs. 
But the genetic line is blurred, argues Gray, noting there are semi-pagan northerners as 
well as southem Muslims, poor tribes in the north as well as relatively affluent southem 
famines (Gray 1963: 1). 
In the north, the immigrant Arab strain has widely intermixed with the indigenous 
African. Often it is not colour or facial features which distinguish a northerner from a 
southerner, but speech, mannerisms and upbringing ... The educated elite of both groups 
have far more in common with each other than with their illiterate fellows; there are 
Marxists, democrats and totalitarians on both sides. Yet despite these cultural aflfmities 
which cross the line, a northerner, however poor or well-educated, identifies himself with 
the north, while a southerner, even if a Muslim or a graduate of Khartoum, remains 
committed to his group (Gray 1963: 1). 
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Lesch also maintains that the perception of a dominant Arab Islamic culture belies the 
reality of heterogeneity: "At independence, barely 40 per cent of the country claimed 
Arab descent and a slim majority of 51 per cent spoke Arabic as their indigenous 
language" (Lesch 1998: 33). 
Lesch draws from an oft-quoted 1956 survey: 
TABLE 1 
SUDAN: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION (1956)* 
Percentage of total population 
Arabs 39 
Those of African stock: Southemers 30 
Westerners 13 
Nubians 3 
Beja 6 
Nuba 6 
Others 3 
Africans of Negroid stock are southemers, westerners and Nuba, who make up 49 per 
cent of the population. By westerners is meant West African peoples, mostly Nigerians, 
who on their way back and forth to Mecca, have settled or become domiciled in the Sudan 
(Oduho&Dengl963:8). 
* Published in Khartoum Morning News in 1958 (Oduho & Deng 1963: 8) 
Mediaeval Muslim geographers named the area south of the Sahara Desert Bilad Al 
Sudan, Arabic for Land of the Blacks (Holt & Daly 1979: 1). But Lesch argues Sudan is 
seen as marginal in the Arab and Muslim worlds: 
Arabs tend to view northern Sudanese as African, due to their skin colour and cultural 
patterns, and have even used the humiliating term abid to describe them. Similarly, 
Sudanese are marginal to the Mushm world, lying on the frontiers of Africa and generally 
adhering to syncretic religious practices that diverge from strict orthodoxy (Lesch 1998: 
212-3). 
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Sultans and slaves 
For many, life remained little changed for centuries. However, independent sultanates 
were established in Sennar on the Blue Nile and Darfiir in the west from the seventeenth 
century and the rulers of these increasingly Islamic states adopted an Arab identity. 
"Being a Muslim - and in Sennar and the north, being both a Muslim and an Arab -
became virtually synonymous with the privilege of full membership of the state and a 
defence against exploitation" (Vemey 1995: 11). Slave raiding was well-established as 
an activity of the state, religion and ethnic origin were key indicators of social status 
(Vemey 1995:11). 
The slave trade prospered further during the Turko-Egyptian period from around 1821 to 
1883. The viceroy of Egypt, Mohamed Ali, had considerable military and economic 
resources to assist him in expanding his empire, he sought "not merely to acquire 
territory in the traditional Ottoman fashion, but to exploit its resources of men and natural 
products" (Holt & Daly 1979: 47). A 4000-strong force left Cairo in July 1820, marching 
down the Nile to Sennar and conquering all along the way, however, a second party sent 
to Kordofan and Darfur the following year was less successful (Holt & Daly 1979: 49-
53). 
Nevertheless, the slave route had been expanded and in 1822 alone, around 30,000 slaves 
were taken from the White Nile area (Gurdon 1986: 6). Northern Arab Sudanese acted as 
middlemen, procuring slaves for Egypt and the Arabian peninsula and moving further 
into southern Sudan (Gurdon 1986: 6). For many indigenous Africans, this was their first 
contact with Arabs and future relations were tainted by the experience (Gurdon 1986: 6). 
The Mahdiya 
By 1881, a new force was developing in the north under the leadership of Mohamed 
Ahmed, son of a Dongala boat builder. He had declared himself to be the long-awaited 
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Al Mahdi or messiah and had won a number of stunning victories over the Egyptian 
administrators (Holt & Daly 1979: 14-16). He was supported by merchants and slave 
traders hard hit by taxes and intervention by ofiScials such as Britain's General Charles 
Gordon, who sought to stamp out the slave trade. 
By 1885, the Mahdi and his Ansar followers had captured Khartoum after a long siege, 
slaying Gordon to the dismay of Britain's Queen Victoria. Later that year, the Mahdi died 
and an expedition by his successor the Khalifa failed to conquer the southern region of 
Equatoria. In 1898, the Ansar were finally routed by the British. This spelt the end of 
the Mahdiya, but the Mahdi's legend has lived on, especially among northem Sudanese 
who claim him as the father of independence or renewer of the Muslim faith (Holt & 
Daly 1979: 87). Nevertheless, describing him as a "nationalist leader who united the 
tribes of the Sudan by an Islamic ideology, drove out the alien rulers and laid the 
foundations of a nation-state" interprets the consequences of his revolt, rather than his 
motives, argue Holt and Daly (Holt & Daly 1979: 87) The Mahdi's Ansar formed the 
base for what later became the Umma Party, a major northem political party. His great-
grandson, Sadiq Al Mahdi, has twice been Prime Minister of Sudan and has been head of 
the Umma Party for 40 years. 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
When the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was formed in 1898, the country was a 
disparate group of tribal, regional and religious alliances that did not think of itself as a 
north and a south, let alone a country. Many tribes had only vague knowledge of people 
other than their own neighbours, contact between north and south had often been 
poisoned by Turko-Ottoman and even Mahdist slave raids (Deng 1995:76). 
All over Afnca, there was a scramble for power by colonial governments, with Britain, 
France and Belgium showing an interest in the Nile Valley and Britain winning out with 
the aim of protecting Egypt further north (Abd Al-Rahim 1969: 24). Borders were drawn 
arbitrarily, based on administrative boundaries rather than existing tribal patterns and 
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cultural and linguistic realities. As a result, groups such as the Luo found themselves 
living in both Sudan and Kenya, while the Madi and Acholi were divided by the border 
between Uganda and Sudan. 
As the British strengthened their administration, cleavages between the north and south 
were further widened through their southern policy whereby closed district and education 
policies effectively limited contact between the two groups. Northern traders (jellaba) 
were forbidden to enter the south, while Greek and Syrian traders and foreign Christian 
missionaries were welcomed (Deng 1995: 81). The condominium was slow to start 
schools in the south, relying on missionaries to provide classes in local languages for 
juniors, moving to English for seniors. In the north, students were taught in Arabic, with 
advanced classes in English. 
Development of the south was stunted, while the north was able to move ahead. 
However the colonial presence did deter slave traders. Deng argues that whatever is said 
against British rule in Sudan, "it brought the longest period of peace and security, at least 
from invasion and the use of crude force, that has been experienced in the south 
throughout recorded history" (Deng 1972: 152). 
Meanwhile, centrally-located tribes such as the Nuba and Ingessana - neither southern 
nor Arab - had little chance for "development, education and exposure to the outside 
world" (Vemey 1991: 9). The spread of Christianity in the Nuba Mountains contributed 
to persecution and denial of political rights under successive Sudanese governments 
(Vemey 1991:32). 
Juba Conference 
In 1947, northem and southern leaders were brought together by the British to discuss the 
'Southem Problem' at the Juba Conference. Past plans to join the non-Islamic southern 
Sudan to Kenya or Uganda were scotched and calls by southem chiefs for a step-by-step 
approach to unity ignored (Alier 1991: 20). histead, the south was more or less 
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railroaded into forming one country with the north (Alier 1991: 20). Albino notes that 
the British civil secretary's opening speech made no secret of the expected outcome, 
indicatmg that for reasons of history, geography, river transport and so on, the area must 
turn to the north (Albino 1970:25). 
Following the decision, the borders between the two regions were thrown open, religious 
freedom was allowed, Muslim preachers could enter the south and government wages 
were equalised for northemers and southemers doing the same work (Alier 1991: 21). 
"A Legislative Assembly was set up consisting of 93 members of whom 65 were elected, 
10 were nominated by the Govemor-General and 18 others were ex-officio ... Thirteen of 
the 93 represented the southern Sudan" (Alier 1991: 21). 
The 1950s also saw the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, later to evolve into the Islamic 
Charter Front (1960s) and National Islamic Front (1980s), with Hassan A1 Turabi at the 
hehn. Modem Islamism brought with it a vision of an Islamic state: "The debate itself 
was triggered in the first place by the Islamists' campaigns for the enforcement of an 
Islamic constitution and Islamic legislation" (Sidahmed 1996: 7) 
Independence 
Sudan became independent on January 1, 1956, with the Legislative Assembly grabbing 
power in a gap between appointments of governors-general. But perceived 
discrimination by northern leaders towards the south had already resulted in a mutiny in 
1955 by southem forces in Torit. The country began its independent history with a civil 
war underway, setting the pattem for years of repression and attempts to deal with the 
core problems of racism and centralised power through the barrel of a gun. 
By 1958, Prime Minister Ismail A1 Azhari's inaugural government had been ousted by 
General Ibrahim Abboud, whose hardline approach to the south entrenched opposition. 
Voll argues that Abboud relied on firepower, not negotiation and leading southem 
politicians "fled into exile or went into the back country in the south. As the 
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government's repression became more violent, the southern response increased its 
militancy" (Voll & Voll 1985: 75). 
Nimeiri's May Revolution 
By May 1969, Sudan was ripe for change and a group of oflBcers led by Colonel Gaafar 
Mohamed Nimeiri took power with communist and leftist support. Three years later, 
Nimeiri was lauded for the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which sealed a peace deal 
between Khartoum and the southem rebel forces known as Anyanya. The 18-year civil 
war was over and regional autonomy had been won for the south. 
But the glowing promises of President Nimeiri and his team did not endure. After 11 
years, the south disintegrated into civil war yet again, after Nimeiri moved in 1983 to 
further abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement. When he tried to transfer a garrison of 
southem troops from Bor in Upper Nile to northern Sudan, the troops mutinied and 
disappeared into the bush. With them went former Anyanya officer Colonel Dr John 
Garang de Mabior, soon to lead the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). 
By September 1983, Nimeiri had introduced a version of sharia or Islamic law, winning 
support from Hassan A1 Turabi's National Islamic Front. But severe famine in rural 
areas, economic constraints, food and petrol shortages m the capital and repressive 
policies brought the downfall of Nimeiri in a military coup in 1985, followed by partial 
elections in 1986 and yet another miUtaiy coup in 1989. 
Bashir and the Islamists 
It was now the turn of Omar Hassan A1 Bashir and his hardline National Salvation 
Islamic government to try running Africa's largest nation. Lesch says both military and 
politicians maintained that: 
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Islam and Arabic were the essential bases for the country's nationalism and should define 
its legal, political and economic systems. Arabic should supercede indigenous languages 
as well as English, the coloniser's language. Minorities must either merge into that 
Islamic culture or be exempt from a few religious punishments. Christians could practice 
their faith, but adherents of traditional African faiths could be compelled to convert, since 
they were not monotheist people of the book (Lesch 1998: 113). 
Sixteen years later, attempts to redraw the country as an Arab-Muslim nation have not 
succeeded, at least not as intended. Nor has Bashir been able to defeat John Garang, 
although both sides have paid heavily with at least a million lives lost and many more 
injured and displaced. 
A New Sudan? 
Deng notes that in the interim, many southerners have become fluent in Arabic and there 
may be more southern Muslims (Deng 1995: 28). Yet he argues that sentiments dividing 
the north and south along racial, ethnic and nationalistic lines "appear to have mtensified, 
despite the vision of a new, unified Sudan postulated by the SPLM" (Deng 1995: 28). 
The New Sudan is the SPLM's vision for a united, democratic, secular government (ICG 
January 2002: 46). hi this Utopia, what has long been seen as a southem problem would 
become an issue for Sudan as a whole, resolvable only with constitutional restructuring of 
the nation-state, hi the words of Abusabib: "This perspective has shattered completely the 
old south-north dichotomy as the perceptual basis of the Sudanese crisis since 
independence. At a deeper level it has added a new dimension to the way the northern 
identity is being perceived" (Abusabib 2001: 91). 
Identity issues are discussed on the street, with a young guard at a club in Khartoum 
asking: "Look at me, what do you see - am I an Arab or an African?" The reply was that 
he was Sudanese.^ 
® Remark to me in Khartoum, 2004 
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Sudan's early history, with slave trade followed by colonialism, set the scene for later 
troubles. Since independence, national governments have spent more time fighting wars 
than developing the country or working to ensure a cohesive Sudanese identity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SUDANESE IDENTITY 
A country divided 
We have seen that Sudan is a vibrant mix of races, rehgions and traditions, developed as 
two separate entities under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. In the lead-up to 
independence, the north was keen to ensure the south was drawn into the Sudanese fold. 
Opinions differed in the north and south about British rule and whether it helped heal or 
widen cleavages between the two areas. 
Lesch says that today's Islamists argue that British and missionary prejudice against 
Islam and Arabic culture made the "educated southern elite hate the north" while the 
north often viewed the south as the "lost brother snatched away by the aliens and long 
due back" (Lesch 1998: 33). She argues that Islamists believe the British aimed to create 
an anti-Islamic culture: "Islamist leader Hassan A1 Turabi asserts that without the forced 
separation, southern ethnic groups would have disappeared through intermarriage and the 
gradual diffusion of Arabic and Islam" (Lesch 1998: 33). 
But Turabi fails to recognise the clear preference of many in the south for their own 
customs and beliefs. Deng notes that a traditional Dinka considers his country the best in 
the world, whatever the deprivations and troubles (Deng 1972: 6). "For a Dinka to 
threaten his relatives with leaving Dinkaland was seen as little short of suicide. What a 
lot to give up - and for what!" (Deng 1972: 6). 
While the north maintained that the British had divided the countiy, the south believed 
that the British had united it. Rather than perceiving colonial intervention as a problem, 
some Dinka chiefs believed the British were brought to Sudan by earlier tribal leaders to 
save them from the Ai^ib slave traders (Deng 1972: 152-158). The British policy of 
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indirect rule through 'native administration' allowed Sudanese to fill government jobs up 
to a certain level of seniority and traditional leaders to exercise some powers, thus 
strengthening tribal chiefs and traditional institutions as well as providing a way to rule 
Sudan on the cheap (Deng 1972: 155). 
Through native administration, Britain also hoped to avoid creeping nationalism, but 
Woodward argues "nationalism was an even more complex, if at that time remote, 
problem for the south (Woodward 1990: 47). 
In the early twentieth century, the British were far more concerned about northern 
nationalism than possible stirrings in the south. They were worried that increasing 
Egyptian nationalism would be spread by soldiers serving in Sudan, but "there was little 
overt reaction to the Egyptian revolution" (Holt and Daly 1979: 131). 
White Flag League and Graduates Congress 
After World War One, a series of Sudanese political organisations with a nationalist bent 
began to emerge. In 1922, an ex-Sudanese army officer and son of Dinka slaves, Ali 
Abdal Latif, was arrested for trying to get a newspaper article published titled The Claims 
of the Sudanese Nation. Abdal Latif had been dismissed from the army following a clash 
with an English officer whom he found arrogant (Abd Al-Rahim 1969: 104). By 1923, 
he was a celebrity. With other government employees, he founded the White Flag 
League, "apparently with Egyptian encouragement and backing" (Holt and Daly 1979: 
131). The League wanted Nile Valley unity in the form of a closer relationship with 
Egypt, a move which alarmed the British, as did the support from ex-army and 
government staff. The group also challenged established religious and tribal notables 
such as the Ansar (headed by the Mahdi family) and Khatmiya (Mirghani family) (Holt 
and Daly 1979: 133). In due course, Abdal Latif was imprisoned yet again and the revolt 
squashed by government forces. 
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The demise of the White Flag League crushed the "fost modem struggle for freedom in 
the Sudan," argues Lesch (Lesch 1998: 30). But she notes analysts often omit Abdal 
Latif s Dinka heritage and his parents' slave background. 
That would imply that a southerner of slave origin could be the authentic leader of an 
interethnic Sudanese national movement. Moreover, analyses sometimes omit the fact 
that Mahdi and Mirghani - along with other religious and tribal elites - viewed Abdal 
Latif as a dangerous upstart (Lesch 1998:30). 
It was not until the late 1930s that Sudanese began once again to organise themselves on 
a nationvsdde basis. Various clubs of high school graduates - an elite group at the time -
merged to form the Graduates General Congress in 1938, aiming to serve the public 
interest of the country and the graduates. Abd Al-Rahim argues that the group was 
obliged to keep their stated goals vague. "[It] was necessary not only to guarantee the 
unity and solidarity of the graduates in supporting their new organisation, but also in 
order to ensure the approval of the govemment" (Abd Al-Rahim 1969:125). 
Establishing the Congress was a victory for the young and nationalistic post-1924 
generation. They wanted to break away from the rigid, feudally-based Ansar and 
Khatmiya groups and create a non-sectarian nationalist movement in Sudan (Abd Al-
Rahim 1969: 130). 
The northern Sudanese nationalist movement opposed native administration and Britain's 
southern policy, which they felt would give the three southern provinces a different 
character and outlook from the rest of the country and could see them separated from 
Sudan and lumped with other possessions frirther south (Abd Al-Rahim 1973: 37). But 
they were divided over Sudan's independent fiiture, with many Muslims seeing 
nationalism as an extension of faith and allegiance, therefore, as something that is owed 
to Islam rather than to a nation (Abd Al-Rahim 1973: 37-39). 
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Multiple identities 
The issue of identity was a key issue for the nationalist movement. Mahmoud argues that 
early activists displayed an Arab-Islamic identification because they came from the 
riverain north, but on the other hand, the Muslim masses in the north were ambivalent 
about Arabism due to their ethnic and linguistic diversity (Mahmoud 2001: 5). 
Further, politically conscious northern Sudanese may have been actively against 
identifying with their African roots, classing that heritage as part of the jahiliya - the Age 
of Ignorance or World of Darkness, argues Abd A1 Rahim (Abd Al-Rahim 1973: 39). 
For Muslim Sudanese, the Islamic community is global and demands supranational 
loyalty, maintain Voll and Voll: "The centre of this global community and its tradition is 
outside the Sudan. As a result, a significant part of the Sudanese identity is itself defined 
by external elements" (Voll & Voll 1985:123). 
The Arab dimension of the Sudanese identity raises similar problems. Many early 
nationalists considered themselves Arabs and supported Nile Valley unity: 
These Arab Sudanese political leaders also dominated politics at independence. They 
brought the Sudan not only into the United Nations but also into the Arab League. 
Within that framework, the Sudan is an Arab country, although in strict ethnic-historical 
terms the majority of Sudanese are not Arabs. Enthusiastic Arab nationalists often speak 
of the one Arab nation and work to create a sense of national identity that ignores 
artificial political borders. When Sudanese Arab leaders stress the Arabness of the Sudan 
too vigorously, they arouse the fears of many non-Arab Sudanese (Voll & Voll 1985: 
123). 
Voll and Voll argue there is a third, less controversial, supranational identity: Afiican. 
Sudanese, whether or not they are Arab or Muslim, recognise that the Sudan is in Africa 
and that African causes have some importance for the Sudanese position in world affairs. 
As a result, Sudanese leaders, especially those who are trying to lessen the potential 
tensions aroused by an Arab or Islamic orientation to policy, have been active in African 
continental politics (Voll & Voll 1985: 124). 
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While the Graduates Congress did not eliminate major divisions in northem Sudanese 
politics, it was a major step towards modem party politics in the Sudan (Voll & Voll 
1985: 55). By the 1940s, two mainstream political parties had appeared, the National 
Unionist Party and the Umma Party. Sidahmed notes that the parties were based on the 
influence of the major religious sects, Ansar and Khatmiya, and continue to divide the 
loyalties of the majority of Sudanese Muslims until today (Sidahmed 1996: xiii). 
Towards independence 
As World War Two drew to a close, the nationalist clamour for independence grew 
stronger and the Graduates Congress pushed the government to end southern isolation 
(Alier 1992: 18). But if the south was to be brought out of its wraps, which way would 
Britain push it - to Uganda and Kenya or to northem Sudan? 
At first, it seemed that the British wanted a quid each way. In 1944, civil secretary Sir 
Douglas Newbold produced a policy statement reaffirming the govemment's belief that 
the south was African and Negroid (Alier 1992:18). Newbold wrote: 
Our obvious duty is therefore to push them ahead as far as we can with economic and 
educational development so that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves 
in the future whether their lot be eventually cast with the northem Sudan or with East 
Africa, or partly with each (cited in Alier 1992:18). 
But the sudden death of Newbold in March 1945 brought a replacement secretary with 
different ideas. Feartlil of northem nationalist calls for unity with Egypt, Sir James 
Robertson did a backflip, stating as follows: 
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the southern Sudan is to act upon the 
facts that the peoples of the southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid but that 
geography and economics combine (so far as can be seen at the present time) to render 
them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle Eastem and Arabicised 
northem Sudan (cited in Alier 1992:19). 
The Juba Conference in 1947 was held in response to the concerns of British 
administrators m the south who were not impressed by Robertson's statement. Northem 
leaders and southern chiefs, junior southern officials and non-commissioned southern 
oflBcers attended, along with British officials (Alier 1992: 20). Robertson argued later 
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that the conference was designed to determine the capabilities of southerners and had no 
bearing on his decision to merge north and south. He said: 
It was quite inaccurate, therefore, for some people to say later that at the Juba conference 
the southern representatives agreed to come in with the north ... The only decision 
resulting from the conference was taken by me (cited in Alier 1992: 21). 
But Alier is adamant that the merger was "literally rammed down the throats of southern 
representatives," despite southern chiefs urging caution, saying such a union required the 
same attention to detail as a marriage negotiation, lest a hurried union resulted in an 
unhappy home and violent divorce (Alier 1992: 19-20). 
The British had fostered southern tribal manners and languages and given a free hand to 
the foreign religion of Christianity rather than Islam, argues Toynbee (Toynbee 1970: ix). 
He says their abrupt abdication left a mainly Arabic-speaking and entirely Muslim north 
confronting a mainly pagan south led by a small missionary-educated Christian 
intelligentsia (Toynbee 1970: ix). "The British differentiated the northern and southern 
Sudanese from each other without separating them from each other politically" (Toynbee 
1970: ix). 
But despite misgivings, the shotgun wedding was to go ahead and there was a rush to 
bring southern education and economy up to northern speeds. The first government 
intermediate school was opened in the south that year and a secondary school two years 
later. By 1950, there was an agricultural and trading venture covering cotton and oil 
seeds in the southern province of Equatoria. 
Southerners were nervous and their fears increased when northern leaders visited Egypt 
in 1952 and 1953 to discuss a possible merger with Cairo without including the south in 
their party. Next, the transitional govenmient decreed Arabic as the only official 
language. Intermediate and secondary schools were to teach in Arabic, the south was to 
be assimilated into the northern Arabic education system, rather than children starting 
studies in their local tribal language followed later by English, says Lesch (Lesch 1998: 
34-35). 
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Sudanisation brings northernisation 
The Sudanisation of the civil service became another bone of contention as southerners 
missed out on government jobs, fuelling perceptions of discrimination. Lesch notes that 
of 800 senior administrative posts announced in 1954, only six went to southemers 
(Lesch 1998: 34-35). Even given the relative disparity in education between north and 
south, the numbers indicate a clear northern bias. She continues: 
No southemers became governors, deputy govemors or district commissioners; northern 
officials ruled the south. The all-northem Sudanisation commission claimed that 
southemers lacked seniority, experience and academic degrees; their lack of fluency in 
Arabic was an important, though unstated, factor (Lesch 1998: 34-35). 
By 1955, the civil war was underway. A government report investigating the uprisings in 
the south that year noted that for historical reasons, southemers regarded northerners as 
their traditional enemies (cited in Deng 1995: 26-27). The report stated that southern 
loyalties remained with their tribes and they had neither "a feeling of common citizenship 
with the northem Sudanese, nor a feeling of nationalism or patriotism to the Sudan as a 
whole" (cited in Deng 1995: 26-27). The report identified the principal challenges to 
state and nation building posed by Sudan's identity issue: 
The cleavage resulting from this fundamental crisis of nationhood has been at the root of 
the chronic conflict that has afflicted the country since independence, has undermined 
successive govemments and remains the main obstacle to peace, unity and stability" 
(Deng 1995:27). 
At independence in 1956, there was a curious sense of anti-climax, with the new 
government led by Ismail A1 Azhari seen as merely the colonial successor rather than its 
supplanter (Holt & Daly 1979: 167). The nationalists who founded the republic were 
deeply affected by Western culture and political ideas and sought to control the 
administration built up under tiie condominium, not to destroy it, argue Holt and Daly 
(Holt & Daly 1979: 167). Sidahmed says the Ansar-Khatmiya coalition promised to put 
aside their differences and "cooperate on what is bound to bring happiness, welfare, 
freedom and complete sovereignty to the Sudanese people" (Sidahmed 1996: 57). 
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However, government policy appeared to favour the north, argue Russell and McCall 
(Russell & McCall 1973: 110). Numerous agricultural projects planned for the south 
were thwarted by the government, including a proposed sugar factory for Mongalla that 
was eventually built at Khasm A1 Girba in the north; a planned German papyrus paper 
factory for Malakal that was stymied when the government insisted it be built in the 
north; the flourishing Zande cotton scheme started by the British that was deserted during 
the civil war and the transfer of the copper-bearing area of Hofrat En Nahas from Bahr A1 
Ghazal to Darfiir province, effectively moving the potential mines and their profits to the 
north (Russell & McCall 1973: 110-111). These moves by the govemment prevented 
areas of the south from being exposed to new technologies, denied people employment in 
their home areas and fostered a policy of using the south's resources without benefit for 
its citizens - a policy that was to reappear later when oil was discovered. 
Albino notes that the south was told for years that its backwardness was a legacy from the 
imperialists (Albino 1970: 89). "The reason given for not developing the south always 
remains the same. It is because the south is underdeveloped" (Albino 1970: 89). 
Although nowhere in Sudan could be said to be blessed with an abundance of 
irifrastructure, the figures for schools and intakes for police and army give a fiirther 
indication of disparities between the north and south. Before independence, there were 
14 secondary school streams for boys in the north and just three in the south, after 
independence, 45 in the north and still just three in the south (Albino 1970: 100). Girls' 
education was an even sorrier tale - there was no govemment secondary school at all for 
girls in the south and only nine girls' secondary schools in the north, while an 
intermediate girls' school at Maridi in the south reopened for just a year in 1963 after 
being closed for eight years (Albino 1970:100). 
The Sudan Police College enrolled ten northemers and three southerners under the British 
in 1950, while by 1964 it took in 35 northemers and just two southerners (Albino 1970: 
104). "Since independence, 153 northemers have gone through the college, as against 
only seven southerners - about four per cent ... The highest rank held by the top five 
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southerners in the army in 1965 was that of major. The rest were captains and below -
the majority being lieutenants" (Albino 1970: 104-105). In 1954, one southemer and 19 
northemers were commissioned as officers in the army, by 1965, four southerners were 
commissioned compared with 67 northemers (Albino 1970: 105). 
A table below detailing bank branches by province reveals a paucity of banks in regional 
areas, including Darflir, the Nuba area of South Kordofan and the south. It reflects both 
the lack of modem economic activity in the regions as well as the lack of infrastructure 
and is a pointer to the latter day grievances of opposition groups. 
TABLE 2 
SUDAN: DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS BY PROVINCE (1975 AND 1981) 
1975 1981 
Khartoum 33 61 
Kassala 12 18 
Red Sea 10 13 
Blue Nile 7 10 
White Nile 6 10 
Gezira 10 18 
Northern 5 6 
Nile 5 8 
Northern Kordofan 8 10 
Southern Kordofan 2 4 
Northern Darfur 3 4 
Southern Darfur 6 8 
Upper Nile* 3 3 
Eastern Equatoria* 1 1 
Westem Equatoria* 1 5 
BahrAlGhazal* 1 2 
Jonglei* - 1 
Lakes* - 1 
Total 113 183 
* indicates southern province 
Source: Bank of Sudan, reprinted in Sudan Yearbook (Sudanow 1983: 144). 
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Rural movements 
While national debates took place in an urban setting, the sectarian base of the main 
political parties meant they were always looking to boost support in their rural 
strongholds (Woodward 1990: 98). In time, regional movements would appear in less 
developed areas of rural Sudan - Kordofen, Nuba Mountains, Darfiir, Red Sea region and 
the south, created by rural elites rather than rural masses (Kurita 1994: 208-9). These 
movements were led by professionals or former officials educated in Khartoum who were 
often sons of tribal chiefs or local merchants. Kurita notes that they came from a rural 
social class with very strong ties with the outside world; in some cases, the "local leader 
and champion of regionalism (and often anti-Arabism) turned out to be the descendant of 
an Arab merchant long settled in the region" (Kurita 1994: 208-9). An exception was the 
General Union of the Nuba Mountains, which drew support from ordinary Nuba people 
in Khartoum, ex-soldiers and hospital staff (Kurita 1994: 209). 
A military coup in 1958 brought General Ibrahim Abboud to power. He ramped up the 
war, sending many more southerners fleeing to Uganda and Kenya, where those who had 
the chance to continue schooling did so in English rather than Arabic. He was removed 
by popular uprising in 1964, but the war continued under various civilian leaders 
including Umma's Sadiq A1 Mahdi. By the time of Colonel Gaafar Nimeiri's May 
Revolution in 1969, the stage was set for lengthy peace negotiations with Joseph Lagu 
and the rebel Anyanya forces, cuhninating in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. 
The golden days of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
For Sudan, the Addis Ababa Agreement brought the first real chance since independence 
to try to forge a new identity for the country, one that embraced all of its peoples. Deng 
views the early days of the accord as "a golden era in north-south relations" P e n g 1995: 
384). He argues while the history of north-south relations is negative and divisive, this 
relatively peaceful period allowed Sudan to play its long-postulated role of Afro-Arab 
moderator and link between Africa and the Middle East (Deng 1995: 384). "Judging 
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from its subsequent demise, however, the accord certainly did not enjoy a national 
consensus and especially the support of the Muslim right" (Deng 1995: 384). 
The catchcry of the Nimeiri government was 'unity in diversity' and over the ensuing 
years, various monuments to unity and the Addis Ababa Agreement sprang up around the 
country, such as Unity Gardens, Unity Bank and Unity High School in Khartoum. When 
oil was found near Bentiu in the south, the area was named Unity Field. In the south, 
some parents named their boys Nimeiri. A carved wooden Unity Statue in Juba Cultural 
Gardens depicted a northerner and a southerner joining hands - though still standing in 
1986,^ it had outlived the agreement it represented (SPLM 1986: 24). 
In 1972, Nimeiri pledged to develop a new constitution reflecting: 
1. National unity 
2. Striving for the establishment of a socialist society based on sufficiency and social 
justice 
3. Restructuring of social and economic relationships 
4. Stability of government through institutions, laws and replacing loyalty to individuals 
by loyalty to the nation (cited in Khalid 1985: 49). 
With more southerners in positions of power and influence, it was possible to shape a 
more balanced Arab-African policy both domestically and internationally. As joumalist 
and fonner Minister for Information and Culture, Bona Malwal, has put it: 
National policy has always been characterised by what have largely been lip-service 
labels. So the question of an Afro-Arab, an Arab or an African Sudan was always 
something any government would pronounce without giving much attention to the 
content of the policy and its implementation ...The things we tried to do were erased 
almost instantly after we left the government. In the Ministiy of Culture and Information, 
for instance, I had an annual cultural festival in which we would honour poets, artists, 
writer from both south and north, from both the African and the Arab elements ... We 
had gone to a stage where you found dancers from northern Sudan singing songs of the 
tribes in southern Sudan and dancing southem dances and vice versa ... During my time, 
nobody would start the news with a Quranic recitation; this is now the case (cited in Deng 
1995:382). 
' N o details available on whether it survived the war. 
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Mansour Khalid, foreign minister for much of the Nimeiri period, explains that there was 
a deliberate attempt to broaden the Sudanese image to reflect all aspects of their culture. 
He says: 
The post-Addis Ababa period ushered in a Sudanese renaissance reflected in many things 
that people take for granted today. Among the latter was the concern of the regime 
towards Sudanese customs and the opening of the Sudanese Museum, the Nubian 
archives, the care to endow a significant status to the Nubian Christian kingdom, the 
promotion of Sudanese folklore (cited in Deng 1995: 382). 
But there was always due attention paid to the country's Arab background, for political 
and financial reasons as much as ideological links. Malwal explains: 
We were always mindful of our Arab identity as a way of promoting ourselves ... We 
always felt that if we, by which mean the people who were making decisions in this 
process, identified ourselves as Muslims and Arabs, more capital would flow in. So there 
is no denying we became hostages of our own ideological tilt and we linked it to our 
economic decisions and our economic behaviour (cited in Deng 1995: 379). 
However, accusations of ethnic bias increased the longer Nimeiri stayed in power. 
Woodward notes that as well as favouring his family, Nimeiri was accused of pandering 
to Nubians.' 
Although only two to three per cent of the total Sudanese population, Nubians constituted 
16 to 18 per cent of the people of Khartoum in 1955-56 and the percentage is probably 
higher today. Of seven heads of government since independence, four have been 
Nubians and many ministers and senior civil servants have been of this ethnic group. 
Nubians were also heavily represented in the transport parastatals, higher education, 
banks and big business houses and legal and religious posts (Woodward 1990: 194). 
The Agreement collapses 
As time elapsed, so did Nimeiri's credibility as the fiiend of the south and his reputation 
was sullied forever when he abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 by splitting 
the south into three regions. Later that year, Nimeiri introduced what became known as 
^ Malwal is a Dinka from Gogrial in Bahr A1 Ghazal region and is not a Muslim. 
' N u b i a n s are from the north and should not be confused with the Nuba people from the hills of south 
Kordofan. 
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the 'September law,' a version of sharia (Islamic law) that had been developed under the 
guidance of veteran Islamist and National Islamic Front leader, Dr Hassan A1 Turabi. 
The move brought controversy and further inflamed relations with the south, where war 
had erupted again. There was a heated debate involving media, politicians and jurists, 
coupled with a three-month strike by the judiciary. 
Despite Turabi's deserved reputation as an Islamic thinker, he has been unable to accept 
that some parts of Sudan and some people in Sudan - whether northerners or southerners, 
Muslims, Christians or animists - do not wish to live according to his interpretation of the 
Quran. A pragmatist of the highest water, he maintains that the modem Islamic 
movement in Sudan is not sectarian, but tries to fimction through popular participation 
(Sidahmed 1996:131). Turabi argues: 
We even want our Islamic movement to interact with the Christians. Our program is 
religiously comprehensive, excluding only non-religious ideologists such as Marxist and 
secularist creeds and those opinionated movements which claim to hold direct mandates 
from God'" (cited in Sidahmed 1996: 131). 
Nimeiri's next move was to proclaim himself imam of the whole Sudan, for Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike (Sidahmed 1996: 136). This was an extraordinary change of heart for 
someone who came to power with leftist support and had been praised mtemationally for 
achieving peace. Parts of the country became gripped with famine and Nimeiri's star 
finally began to wane, hi April 1985, there was a popular uprising while he was out of 
the country on an official visit and he was replaced by a transitional military government. 
He had been successfiil in uniting the country after the first civil war, but failed to 
capitalise on the chance to develop a new national persona that included all the different 
peoples of Sudan. 
10 Turabi is referring to Sudan's liberal Muslim reformists, the Republican Brothers. Their leader, 
Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, was executed for apostasy in January 1985, some months before Nimeiri's 
dismissal. 
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Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
Meanwhile, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), was starting to develop a 
more inclusive rhetoric, at least on paper. Rather than fighting for secession, as did the 
Anyanya in the first war, the SPLM and its leader John Garang claimed the whole of 
Sudan as its own. Mohamed Salih explains: 
John Garang de Mabior, a former colonel in the Sudanese army and an economist with a 
doctorate from the University of Iowa, was never in favour of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and was among the few Anyanya officers who argued for the continuation of 
the civil war. Garang, a Dinka, became the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement and the Dinka became the dominant ethnic group in the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (Mohamed Salih 1994: 196). 
The SPLM rejected Khartoum's policy of playing off nationalities against one another, 
argues Atem, writing in the SPLM magazine Newsudan. He maintains that Khartoum 
was hypocritical to claim it was the "architect and guardian of national unity at a time 
when it is carrying out a war of genocide against innocent and defenceless citizens with a 
view to decimating certain ethnic groups" (Atem 1986:15). 
The SPLM Manifesto was keen to provide a definition of the term 'north' covering all 
areas in northern Sudan "in which peripheral development became necessary in order to 
facilitate cheap extraction of surplus by the colonial regime" (SPLM 1983: 4-5). So it 
argued that Khartoum and Blue Nile provinces were part of the north, but all other areas 
in northern Sudan, including Darflir, Kordofan, Kassala and Northern Province were 
deemed underdeveloped areas, just like the southern provinces of Bahr A1 Ghazal, 
Equatoria and Upper Nile known as southern Sudan. 
What we have defined as underdeveloped areas in northern Sudan are the most deceived 
and neglected by the ruling minority clique regime in Khartoum. These minority clique 
regimes have always used the questions of nationality and religion to isolate the struggle 
in the south from that of the underdeveloped areas in the north (SPLM 1983: 4-5). 
Gurdon argued that the SPLM was trying to create a coalition of non-Arab groups within 
Sudan to replace the traditional political parties which had dominated the post-
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independence period (Gurdon 1986: 99). At the same time, he was adamant that the 
SPLM could not win an outright military victory and would find it difficult to create such 
a coalition (Gurdon 1986: 99). 
Because of historical patterns of racism, quite apart from other factors, only a minute 
fraction of the northern Muslim Sudanese would ever accept a government which was 
dominated by southem Sudanese non-Muslims. While the SPLA argues that they will 
ultimately have to accept such an idea, the position is completely unrealistic and the 
SPLA will never form a Sudanese government or be the majority partner in one (Gurdon 
1986:99). 
To date, Guidon's words have proved correct. However, the SPLM has won a following 
in the south, which Mohamed Salih says is due to three factors. 
Firstly, there were the redivision of the south into three regions and the undoing of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, which established southem Sudan as one region, within the 
boundaries inherited from the colonial regime. While Equatorians supported redivision 
in fear of Dinka domination, the Dinka perceived it as an act designed by the Nimeiri 
regime to weaken the bargaining power of a united south. Secondly there were the 
redrawing of the borderiine between north and south in order to put the newly discovered 
oil sites in southem Sudan inside the north and the decision not to build an oil refinery in 
the south, but to build a pipeline that would take crude oil to the north. Thirdly, there was 
the imposifion of the Islamic Sharia laws on all sectors of the Sudanese population, 
Muslims, Christians and animists alike. Although Sharia was not applied in the south, 
southerners living in the north were among its first victims (Mohamed Salih 1994: 195-
196). 
Conclusion 
Hutchinson says that one of nationalism's strengths is "its ability to mobilise a range of 
interests and social strata - fi-om urban secular middle classes to traditionalist peasantries" 
(Hutchmson 1994: 74). But as the second war became entrenched in Sudan, there was 
little sign of the unity in diversity promoted during the early days of Nimeiri's rule. 
It is this failure to galvanise a real sense of national unity or pride in the achievements of 
the country's diverse peoples that has contributed to the ongoing chmate of racism, 
holding back the country. Sudan's leaders to date, whether political or religious, have not 
had the vision to work successfiilly to achieve this goal. Rather, successive governments 
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have seen the plethora of weapons available in the modem world as providing the best 
way to get what they want. 
Racism aflFects the ability of the country to develop a coherent national identity and 
efforts by successive governments to Islamify non-Muslim parts of the country have been 
met with strong resistance. However, once again there is another chance to create a 
viable and vibrant nation, with the signing of the peace agreement to end the second civil 
war. It will require the ability to engender a new sense of national pride in a nation that 
has given itself very little to be proud about. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARABS AND AFRICANS 
New labels for old 
Sudan's first civil war was described as being between northerners and southerners and 
initially the second conflict was also portrayed as a clash between the 'Muslim north and 
the Christian and animist south.' 
However, another differentiation is becoming commonplace in discussions in the media 
and the diaspora. Instead of referring to northerners or southerners, that is, using 
geographical origin as an identifier, disparate Sudanese people or groups are now 
described as African or Arab. Arab in this context may have the same connotation of a 
dirty word for 'Africans' that southemer has had for some ('real') northern Sudanese. 
Use of the African/Arab terminology has caught on, so much so that the more recent 
Darflir conflict is described by international media as a clash between Muslim Arab and 
Muslim African tribes. There has been a change in the way people look at the ethnic 
groups in Sudan and some Sudanese say it comes from the rhetoric of the SPLM. 
Ideas of identity can be just as strong whether they are real or imagined. Rothchild says 
that ethnicity acts as "a pole around which group members can mobilise and compete 
effectively for state-controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts, awards 
and constitutional protections" (Rothchild 1997: 4). One's origins may be imaginary, but 
as political memory interacts with past experience, "new socially constructed identities 
emerge and become the basis of a consciousness that in some instances can prove very 
destructive" (Rothchild 1997: 4). 
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The Minority Rights Group warns against using generic labels to delineate ethnic groups 
in Sudan, arguing rigid classifications introduced during colonial times are artificial 
(Vemey 1995: 39). "Although the nomenclature has come to shape the identity of the 
people concemed, it does not match the fluidity of the situation on the ground" (Vemey 
1995: 39). 
During the first civil war, the military government under Abboud took a heavy-handed 
approach. The soldiers lacked political nouse, handling the situation in the south poorly 
and determined to keep power with the central government at all costs. Abboud and his 
team believed that the basic pillars of national unity were Islam and the Arabic language. 
Their often forcefiil encouragement of Islam and Arabic in the south aroused grave fears 
in the region. As part of this southem policy, the government also placed increasing 
restrictions on non-Sudanese Christians in the south, finally expelling all missionaries in 
1964, on the charge that southem opposition to the government was the product of 
missionary plots (Voll & Voll 1985: 75). 
There were also divisions withm the south itself By the mid-1970s, Equatorians were 
beginning to resent the more numerous Nilotic groups, especially the Dinka who made up 
half the population of the south. Atem notes that a past southem government headed by a 
Dinka made inexcusable mistakes, including appointing and protecting unqualified Dinka 
officials at the expense of competent, experienced non-Dinka (Atem 2003: 8). 
Woodward believes that the Dinka, "while far from homogenous ... were capable of 
displaying segmentary solidarity in the context of regional politics" (Woodward 1989: 
145). 
Malwal notes that Nimeiri's government was effective [at least for a time] in promoting 
Sudan as a "multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-poUtical countiy" 
(Malwal 1981: 246-247). The government attempted to build on these multiplicities, to 
ensure that they enriched one another, "guaranteeing not only the national unity of the 
Sudan, but also its role as a microcosm of the Afi-o-Arab world - a melting pot of the 
Arab and Afiican cultures" (Malwal 1981:246-247). 
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But by 1995, an Amnesty report noted that "the labels Arab and African, Muslim and 
Christian, even northemer and southerner, have become intensely politicised" (Amnesty 
1995: 5-6). 
Ethnic and religious identities are important factors in the deep political cleavages 
running through Sudanese society. They are used to mobilise political support, to assert 
difference, to claim superiority, to determine access to power and to define enemies 
(Amnesty 1995: 5-6). 
Rothchild maintains that race and ethnicity can become a signalling device regardless of 
whether or not the racial or ethnic label is accurate, allowing people to be identified by 
social or economic characteristics, without resorting to elaborate verification procedures 
(Rothchild 1997: 215). 
Identity problems and the toll of war 
If Sudan does have an identity problem, this is arguably part of the reason for its civil 
wars. The failure to recognise and treat the poison of racism is preventing the country 
from becoming a productive nation. Akuany argues that a country founded on 
inequalities or human rights abuses cannot enjoy stability (Akuany 2001: 3). He says a 
country which is "dominantly multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural, and multi-
linguistic cannot successfully be transformed into any one single racial, cultural, religious 
and linguistic community, without holocaust being committed" (Akuany 2001:4) 
Early governments played on religious rather than racial sentiments of north against 
south, but the approach shifted and by 1985, Sudan's government-controlled media was 
describing a coup attempt as planned by "plotters from the west and traitors from the 
south" (Malwal 1985: 22-23). Malwal argued that it was "fragic that racism should be 
deliberately fanned by the state in a country where it has played a fairly marginal role in 
the past" (Malwal 1985: 22-23). 
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However, Amnesty asserts that both the government and the SPLA have "exploited 
ethnic differences and competition over resources in ways which have pitted community 
against community and resulted in the massive abuse of human rights" (Amnesty 1995: 
71). 
The civil war in Sudan has taken a heavy toll. The US Committee for Refugees estimates 
about two million people have died, victims of violence or related starvation and disease 
(ICG January 2002: 3). Around four million people have fled their homes for other parts 
of Sudan, while at least 500,000 have fled to neighbouring countries and as a result, "one 
out of every eight people rendered homeless by war around the world is from Sudan" 
(ICG January 2002:3). 
Many more men, women and children have been injured permanently and/or forced to 
flee their homes. But it is civilians rather than soldiers who have suffered in greater 
numbers. They die from famine and disease, rather than gunshot wounds, unable to 
cultivate their fields, unable to attend schools or visit health clinics, unable to access 
more than subsistence levels of aid from humanitarian groups. 
On both sides, most fighters are southerners, whether from the SPLM or government-
supported militia drawn from rival southem tribes. Even Sudan's army has large 
numbers of southerners dragged from Khartoum streets and sent off to fight their 
southem brothers (Martin 2002: 4). Jok argues that the militias and the militarisation of 
ethnic identity is one of the most pressing issues in the south, adding that the government 
sponsors the militia groups to wreck any chance of southem unity (Jok 2004: 3). 
Khartoum's paramilitary Popular Defence Force (PDF) consists of young Muslim 
conscripts and volunteers whose training is more religious than military and includes long 
lectiires on Islam from members of the NIF (Burr & Collins 2003: 16). The government 
also arms murahileen militias - Baggara tiibesmen who have escalated historic feuds with 
the neighbouring Dinka over grazing land, cattle raiding and abduction of slaves (Martin 
2002: 4). 
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The price of oil 
Tlie scorched earth poHcy has been successfiilly pursued by the government in the oil 
fields and in areas hosting tlie oil pipeline as it runs from the south to Port Sudan. The 
PDF was invaluable here, along with southern militia forces, sometimes recruited from 
units of the SPLA who were dissatisfied with John Garang (Burr & Collins 2003: 254). 
UN agencies, foreign governments and non government organisations all indicated that 
Khartoum was working hard to displace populations from the oil concessions areas 
(Martin 2002: 5). Vemey argues: 
People in the areas around the militarised oil installations and the pipeline route have 
been subject to devastating attacks by govemment forces for years. They are being 
driven from their homes by air-raids and bombardment and by militias supported by the 
govemment. resulting in horrendous suffering (Vemey et al 1999:4). 
Sudan's oil income is currently at least US $500m a year and has kick-started the 
economy, freeing the country from dependence on wealthy Arab and Muslim states 
(Martin 2002: 5. Burr & Collins 2003: 255). In 2002, GDP grew at around 5.1 per cent, 
almost twice the world average and oil production was steady at 245,000 barrels a day 
(ICG December 2002: 18). The war costs an estimated US $1 million per day, but the 
year after the Port Sudan pipeline was completed, the govemment was able to double its 
arms purchases and militar>' spending and boost production of ammunition and small 
arms (ICG Januar>- 2002:102). 
The oil slick has also brought an air of respectability for the government, with Malaysia's 
Petronas. China's National Petroleum Company, Sweden's Lundin Oil, Austria's OMV 
and France's TotalFinaEIf among those keen to do business with Sudan (ICG January 
2002:100-102). Martin notes: 
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Prior to the oil boom, Western diplomats in Khartoum seemed largely concerned with 
Sudan's chronic droughts, floods, reftigee crises and human rights violations. Since oil 
entered the picture, however, foreign emissaries have become more circumspect in their 
criticism of the regime (Martin 2002: 5). 
However, Canada's Talisman left the arena after human rights groups lobbied the 
Canadian government, claiming that Talisman was at least a passive party to human 
rights abuses perpetrated in the oilfields by government-supported forces (ICG January 
2002: 100-102). 
War of resistance and tribal wars 
There are clearly muftiple identities in Sudan, identities that are shaped and moulded by 
the needs of the particular group and by the events around them. Mahmoud says the 
challenges facing Sudan are not unique. 
At the heart of these challenges lies the question of identity and since 1989 this has 
become closely intertwined with the role of Islam. Questions of identity, religion and 
cultural hegemony cannot be divorced from what ultimately underlies them: struggle over 
power and access to resources (Mahmoud 2001: 10). 
The war in the south is a war of resistance fought for centuries in different forms "against 
the Turks, Egyptians, British and the Arabs of northem Sudan" (Young 2003: 423). 
Young argues: 
Feelings of anti-Arabism and anti-Islam are visceral in the southern region and find 
expression in resentment against attempts by Muslims from the north to stop the Africans 
in the south from drinking and practicing Christianity and traditional creeds. The analogy 
to apartheid and white colonialism may be overdrawn, but these sentiments reveal a 
strong affirmation of the peoples' African character and culture. They are also a rejection 
of the assumption that Arab culture is superior and destined to assimilate them (Young 
2003:423). 
Agaw asserts that when it comes to internal fighting, southern tribes have learnt fi-om 
their past mistakes. 
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The experience of the south in self-rule proved that during 11 years from 1972 to 1983 all 
tribes realised, in spite of their diversity, that what ought to be done was to stay together 
in one entity. So when the south cracked with division during 1981, the people knew 
later on that it had been a wrong idea to stay apart from each other (Agaw 1996: 4). 
However Rothchild has some cautionary words, noting that ethnic groups are not usually 
unitary actors for negotiating purposes (Rothchild 1997: 4-5). He maintains that intra-
group problems persist despite nation-building, "allowing political entrepreneurs the 
option of interacting with rival factions on separate bases" (Rothchild 1997:4-5). 
Despite Agaw's optimism, the Sudanese government has been successful in playing off 
rival southern factions against each other, in particular pitting Garang's SPLM-
Mainstream against Riek Machar and Lam Akol's SPLM-United. The tribal allegiances 
of the three leaders (Garang is Dinka, Machar is Nuer, Akol is Collo") fostered 
perceptions of bias and favouritism. When Machar and Akol broke from Garang in 1991, 
there was much bloody fighting, including a massacre by Nuer forces of Dinka civilians 
in Garang's home area of Bor. 
Kurimoto notes that "military conflict since 1984 has exacerbated existing tribal or ethnic 
hostility: Pari versus Lotuho, Pari versus Toposa, Dinka versus Mundari and so on" 
(Kurimoto 1994: 110). However, Kurimoto argues that it is impossible to determine how 
much conflict is due to ethnic issues and group concerns and how much stems from 
regional and national matters (Kurimoto 1994: 110). Both the government and the SPLA 
have manipulated 'traditional' ethnic antagonism to their advantage, maintains Kurimoto 
(Kurimoto 1994: 110). 
Young says that there is little doubt the SPLM is Dinka-dominated, with Dinka from the 
Bor area holding "a disproportionately large number of posts in its leadership" (Young 
2003:425). Yet he adds: 
" Increasingly the Collo (pronounced Chollo) use their own name for themselves, rather than the colonial 
corruption of Shilluk. Dinka is also a colonial corruption, they call themselves the Jieng. 
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Studies of revolutionary movements suggest that some groups invariably have a higher 
level of political consciousness and greater commitment to armed struggle than other 
equally oppressed groups. The issue is not that some ethnic groups have a greater 
willingness to take up arms, but whether their leadership ensures others are not excluded 
from the political and militaty hierarchy (Young 2003:425). 
It is not a Dinka tradition to try to dominate another, argues Malwal. He says the fact 
they make up nearly half the south makes them difficult to ignore in either national or 
southern politics (Malwal 1981: 75). However, their sheer numbers also attract suspicion 
from others. Malwal continues: "Dinka society is a truly free, open and democratic 
society, in which each and every man's view finds its expression, though that has, of 
course, been described by some as anarchy" (Malwal 1981: 75). 
The Nuer have similar traditions and find their own unique ways of resolving disputes, 
notes Ashworth (Ashworth 2004: 37). 
They do not recognise centralised authority but have a very participatory form of 
decentralised governments ... Most factions and movements within the Nuer community 
talk to each other directly or through intermediaries, even when they are at opposite ends 
of the political and military spectrum. Many outsiders are amazed at the speed with 
which southern Sudanese in general, not only the Nuer, can reconcile after the most 
appalling splits and atrocities (Ashworth 2004: 37). 
While Nilotic tribes such as the Nuer, Collo and Dinka may fight among themselves, they 
also regard each other as distant blood relatives, Malwal argues (Malwal 1981: 76). But 
he says that this is not the case with other southern tribes, "especially those from 
Equatoria who remain very suspicious of alleged Dinka domination" (Malwal 1981:76). 
Arabs, Africans and the alienation of a nation 
When Sudan projects its image as that of an Arab nation, many Sudanese feel alienated. 
This is a country that does not recognise all its children. Ahmed Diraige, opposition 
politician and a past governor of Darfiir, argues: 
The exclusive identification of Sudan as an Arab and Islamic nation has been silently 
resented by the indigenous Africans and non-Muslim Sudanese, because it excluded them 
from the opportunity of acquiring political power or effectively sharing it (cited in 
Moszynski2003: 19). 
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National Islamic Front policies polarised Sudan by identifying it as an Arab country: "In 
spite of the NIF claim that the south is exempted from Islamisation policies, that claim is 
not true. There is a stark discrimination against non-Muslim southemers all over the 
country" (Agaw 1996: 3). 
Nevertheless, Novati and Belluci argue that the northern judicial system worked 
relatively smoothly and in fact better than many other systems in Africa, at least before 
Bashir ousted Turabi in late 1999 (Novati & Belluci 2000: 110). 
Sidahmed is adamant that the popular image of a Sudanese war between the Muslim 
north and Christian and animist south is inaccurate, with the reality far more complex 
(Sidahmed 1996: 8-9). He argues that the debate involves "conflicting blueprints and 
visions for the future of the Sudan, focusing on Islamist or secular platforms" (Sidahmed 
1996: 8-9). There are conflicting visions of Sudanese identity, should Sudan be viewed 
as having an African, Arabic-Islamic or Afro-Arab identity (Sidahmed 1996: 8-9). 
Deng asserts the words Arab ism and Africanism have multiple meanings in the Sudanese 
context, "most groups claiming genealogical links with Arab ancestry believe they are 
racially and culturally Arab, complemented by Islam" (Deng 1995: 3). In Sudan, colour 
matters: 
Northern racial pride focuses on being the right brown colour of skin, considered the 
standard for the north and therefore for the Sudan. To be too light for a Sudanese is to 
risk being considered a foreigner, a khawaja (European), a Middle Eastern Arab, or 
worse, a hallabi, a term used for a gypsy-type racial group, considered among the lowest 
of the light-skinned races. The other side of the coin is, of course, looking down on the 
black race as inferior, a condition from which one has mercifully been redeemed. 
Northem Sudanese racism and cultural chauvinism, therefore, condemns both the very 
dark and the very light (Deng 1995: 5). 
Yet the more northerners identify as Arabs, the more the south "asserts its Africanness as 
a counter-identity," Deng argues (Deng 1995: 4). 
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In the SPLM, it is not so much that the Dinka assumes superiority, but more that the 
SPLM has done Uttle to embrace other tribes, "leaving it exposed to factionalism and 
strife," asserts Young (Young 2003: 425). He notes splits in the movement have been 
about power rather than ideology and often become linked to tribe, that is, to race (Young 
2003:426). 
Southerners are attracted to the SPLM because of its resistance to the north. Young 
maintains (Young 2003: 426). He says that "this sometimes produces denigration of the 
northem jellaba [merchants] that verges on racism," including comments that the only 
good (Sudanese) Arab is a dead one (Young 2003: 426). 
Decrying racism among southerners, Atem notes "it is not uncommon to listen to a 
conversation among southern Sudanese, usually the elite, making unflattering statements 
about northerners whom they refer to as Arabs or mundukuru"'^ (Atem 2003: 18). 
Southerners in the diaspora may also echo these views, albeit in a watered down version. 
"A northerner will never accept a southemer as an equal. Jellaba will try to be 
artificially nice, they will give you a business smile," said O, a Sudanese-Australian from 
the south (Levy December 2004). 
However, when Sudanese leave Sudan, some find it opportune to discard their Arab 
identification. Says K, a Sudanese-Australian from the north: "Some Sudanese [in 
Australia] won't live in Arab areas, but in Sudan, they consider themselves an Arab. Out 
of Sudan, they don't want to be Arabs, they say Arabs are unsophisticated" (Levy 
January 2005). Abusabib notes the irony that when travelling in Europe, "for a deeply 
Arab-oriented Northemer, a nod of greeting fi-om a fellow Afiican and the word 'nigger' 
directed at him or her by a racist have, in fact, the same effect, that is in both cases this 
Northemer is reminded that he or she is not an Arab" (Abusabib 2001: 96). 
Pejorative term from Equatoria. 
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Identity and international relations 
On the international stage, Sudan takes a seat at both Arab and African tables. At the 
political level, as opposed to the personal, how welcome are these African Arabs in the 
inner arena of the Gulf states? Are they treated as equals? 
As a government minister during the Nimeiri years, Malwal understood the workings of 
Arab investment in the Sudan; but he maintains that Sudanese got it wrong if they 
thought they could attract Arab investors by emphasising their Arab-Islamic identity 
(cited in Deng 1995: 379). 
Throughout the period I was in the central government and in the Ministiy of Culture and 
Information, if anything, one detected a certain degree of unease in the Arab world when 
the issue of the Arab or Islamic identity of the Sudan was played up in these economic 
discussions. The Arabs wanted to separate their religious or racial aflfmity with the Sudan 
from their economic interest in the country (cited in Deng 1995: 379). 
In Deng's opinion, Sudanese Arabs are keener to belong to the Arab world than the Arab 
world is to have them (Deng 1995: 380). He says that Sudanese working in the Gulf 
states capitalise on their identity as Arabs and Muslims, but these guest workers have also 
been disappointed by racist treatment at the hands of their fellow Arabs because their skin 
is black, "even though they perceive themselves as racially and culturally Arab and even 
though Islam is supposed to be colour-blind" (Deng 1995: 380). 
As it transpired, the Gulf job market dried up when tens of thousands of Sudanese 
workers were expelled after the Gulf War, in retaliation for Sudan's support for Iraq and 
Saddam Hussein. 
Sudan as a Muslim nation 
Sudan may be a second class citizen of the Arab world, but the country does have a 
strong identity as a Muslim nation. However, fostering this identity inevitably creates 
tensions and attempting to do so, in my view, shows a lack of foresight and poor 
leadership. Umma Party leader Sadiq A1 Mahdi is a case in point. He has been Prime 
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Minister twice, is the brother-in-law of Hassan A1 Turabi and great-grandson of the 
Mahdi. He has had many opportunities to work to bridge the divide between the different 
parts of the country, but he has failed to do this, in other words - like so many Sudanese 
leaders, he has been uninspiring. 
As far back as 1966, while Sadiq was touring Somalia prior to becoming Prime Minister, 
he made a telling statement: "The failure of Islam in southern Sudan would be the failure 
of the Sudanese Muslims to the intemational Islamic cause. Islam has a holy mission in 
Afiica and southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission" (cited in Mai wal 1981: 41). 
It is true that the statement was made nearly forty years ago. But it also outlines some of 
the dilemmas for conservative Islamic forces in Sudan, who wish to develop their own 
unique Sudanese model of government. It also outlines the dilemma for the people of the 
south, for the Nuba and the Ingessana, for whom "the identification with either politicised 
Islam or Arabism was a matter to be contested and resisted" (Mahmoud 2001: 7). 
Lesch notes that in 1994, Sadiq's Umma Party still seemed to be wide of the mark when 
analysing the controversial issue of self-determination. An Umma Party statement 
declared that "self-searching into the past" led the party to recognise that "modem 
Sudanese self-consciousness centred ... on their Islamic-Arabic identity" (cited in Lesch 
1998:217). 
This shows a serious lack of insight. Given the makeup of the country, it is at the very 
least unrealistic to expect to build a fully Muslim nation, unless those of differing views 
are prepared to oblige by vanishing into thin air. Further, those Sudanese preferring a 
secular, democratic style of government have a role to play in deciding whether to allow 
Islamists to usurp democratic mechanisms to gain power to implement their own 
programs. 
Warburg says that Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brothers and the National 
Islamic Front (MF), may take part in democratic processes, only to distort democracy 
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once they achieve their goal (Warburg 1999: 4). He argues that the NIF has regularly 
changed its slogans, "introducing and abandoning concepts such as self reliance, return to 
the roots, Islamic social planning and the comprehensive call to God" (De Waal 2001: 
119). He notes that in "multi-ethnic, plural Sudan, a homogenous Islamist enterprise can 
ultimately only be implemented by coercion and coercion is always ugly" (De Waal 
2001:120). 
Novati and Belluci maintain that democracy and human rights are not synonymous, 
although they say the concepts are often confused by Westerners critiquing Islam (Novati 
& Belluci 2000: 109). "The question is not how die sharia can fit into a democratic 
system, but rather which kind of democracy corresponds to the umma (nation)" (Novati 
& Belluci 2000: 109-110). 
It is not just the southem Christians, Copts and other non-Muslims who are opposed to an 
Islamic state. Malwal says that "many pious and well-intentioned Muslims think and feel 
the country would do well not to mix religion with politics" (Malwal 1981: 252). The 
only guarantee of the ideal Islamic state would be for all Sudanese "to become Muslims 
overnight, and devoted and practising Muslims at that," he notes wryly (Malwal 1981: 
252). 
Arrmesty notes that "bigots on all sides, Muslims and Christians aUke, have exploited 
religion, making it a significant factor in the continued fighting" (Amnesty 1995: 57). 
Amnesty says the government is trying to morally reorient Sudanese society, including 
using the sharia-bdiSQd Penal Code 1991 and strict codes of public morality (Amnesty 
1995: 57). 
Although sharia is not applied in the south, for many southemers, especially those living 
in the north, the law "confirms their belief that they are viewed as second class citizens 
by the govemmenf (Amnesty 1995: 57). On the one hand, the government has described 
the war as "a jihad, a holy war against unbelievers in Islam," on the other, some SPLA 
supporters say they are Christians resisting the spread of Islam, nevertheless, there are 
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Muslims and Christians on both sides (Amnesty 1995: 57). Racism and religious bigotry 
guide the behaviour of some powerful and influential people in the war zone; ethnicity 
and intolerance lie behind some of the worst violations of human rights (Amnesty 1995: 
57). 
Ryle argues that "ruling elites in Khartoum view Sudan as a Muslim country and an 
integral part of the Arab world. Their opponents - not only southemers - see it as a 
multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual state, one in which Arabs (though not 
Muslims) are a minority" (Ryle 2002: 3). 
The role of Sudanese Islam 
Surely Islam has a role to play in a peaceful resolution of Sudan's problems, not just the 
war, but the clash of religions and races and cultures. Saikal argues that since the eariy 
seventh century, relations between Islam and the "largely Christian West have been 
marked by long periods of peaceful coexistence, but also by many instances of tension, 
hostility and mutual recrimination" (Saikal 2003: 24). 
Saikal notes that "peacefiil coexistence produced examples of majestic cooperation .. .but 
the periods of tension were created or exploited by those elements from both sides that 
found deterioration of relations advantageous to their causes above and beyond religion" 
(Saikal 2003: 24). Again, this is the pattern that has been followed time and again in 
Sudan, with race and religion providing the perfect delineators. 
In Sudan, it has been the case that under good leadership, tribes with common borders, 
including nomads who travel through the lands of others, have found ways to coexist, 
with or without some conflict. The Ngok Dinka and the Baggara Humr (Misseriya) in 
Southern Kordofan, are a prime example, with Deng noting inter-racial contact and cross 
cultural exchange has been facilitated by mutual recognition, respect and cooperation 
(Deng 1995: 245). 
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Sudan has a number of versions of Islam and is (or was) home to some significant Islamic 
icons, fi-om Sadiq's great-grandfather A1 Mahdi in the 1880s, to Republican Brother 
Mahmoud Mohamed Taha who was executed for apostasy under Nimeiri, to Islamic 
scholar and former Attorney-General Hassan A1 Turabi. 
Contemporary Sudanese militant Islamism has appropriated the Mahdist myth for its own 
ends, argues De Waal (De Waal 2004: 4). The Mahdi's influence has not been confined 
to Sudan, notes Saikal, as his tradition of "Puritanism and Islamic resistance to outside 
domination became a recurring event in the Muslim world" (Saikal 2003: 35). 
On the other hand, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha's approach - and apparently his crime -
was to reinterpret sharia, arguing that "what was appropriate for seventh centuiy Arabia 
could not be equally suited to twentieth century conditions" (Deng 1995: 125). His 
demise may have cheated Sudan out of a 'third way' for resolving its identity dilemmas, 
Deng argues. 
In the long run, the philosophy of the Republicans might have been more successful in 
promoting identification with Islam than the more coercive models that operated. 
Depending on whether such a tolerant process of assimilation into the Islamic mould 
would have been a good or a bad thing for the south, the suppression of Taha's 
perspective meant that an opportunity to develop a more comprehensive, integrative 
sense of national identity was lost (Deng 1995: 127). 
There is another dimension to Sudanese Islamism: "the encounter between the Arab 
orientation of the Muslim Brothers and an indigenous theocratic tradition in West African 
Islam" (De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 77). This Islamist tradition embraces elements 
of both Sufism and Wahabism, but is "a black 'African' tradition rather than an Arab one. 
It disavows the powerful centralised Sufi orders characteristic of the Nile Valley and is 
the vehicle for a popular, messianic tradition" (De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 77). 
Sudan's most famous Muslim son is Hassan A1 Turabi, "one of the most outstanding 
thinkers and practitioners of political Islam" (De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 75). It is 
difficult to argue with their assessment, but one could also postulate that Turabi has 
served Islam and Sudan poorly by failing to address the realities of the ethnic-religious 
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mix in his country. How different the past two decades could have been if Turabi had 
showered bouquets of unity and multiculturalism rather than Islamic brickbats. 
Turabi views the Islamic state as inevitable as it presents the only viable alternative to so-
called Western democracy. 
People have come to believe that it seems democracy would never breed Islam and if it 
threatens to do so, it will be aborted by someone from outside or inside ... if you want to 
assert indigenous values, originality and independence against the West, then Islam is the 
only doctrine that has become the national doctrine (cited in Warburg 1999: 7). 
But De Waal and Abdel Salaam are tantalised by echoes of Westem social science in 
Turabi's writings, hints that he has reconciled Islamism with liberal modernity (De Waal 
& Abdel Salaam 2004: 75). 
Turabi's experiment is an important and instructive exercise in broadening the Islamist 
political imagination. But it too has been shipwrecked on the rocks of reality, in part 
because of its inescapable embrace of violence (De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 75). 
The key steps to implement Turabi's vision have been taken by the army, with the NIF 
using state power to enact an Islamisation strategy called the civilisation project {al 
mashru' al hadhari) - also sometimes the Islamic project. The project's core ideas were 
clearest in the "comprehensive call program {al da 'wa al shamla) that peaked in 1992-6, 
but whose precepts informed official Islamisation pohcies both before and since" (De 
Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 89). 
The Islamists seized power under Omer Hassan Al Bashir in 1989, only the second such 
group in the world to take power, with Iran the first. Lusk notes they were not 
"disgruntled non-commissioned officers or even the then highly professional senior 
officers. This was a dedicated political party - so organised and well financed that it had 
spent years planning for power" (Lusk 2004:13). 
Islamists infiltrated the public service, taking low profile jobs, often in remote areas and 
they also subsidised school teachers (Lusk 2004:13). However, hard line lixndamentalism 
was not popular among Sudanese: "Sudanese Islam is traditionally tolerant and owes 
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much to Sufi teachings" (Lusk 2004; 13). The National Islamic Front won less than ten 
per cent of the vote in partial elections in 1986, but Lusk believes it would fare even 
worse today and in any case, carmot afford to hold elections promised as part of the peace 
process (Lusk 2004:13). 
Chief peace negotiator and First Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha'^ has played a 
central role in Sudan's Islamic social planning, establishing the social planning ministry 
to pursue his goals "in accordance with the NIF interpretation of the sharia" (De Waal & 
Abdel Salaam 2004: 89). 
The comprehensive da'wa program was ambitious and complex, bringing together 
education, proselytising, humanitarian, development, financial and counter-insurgency 
efforts (Afiican Rights 1997: Chapter 9, De Waal 2001: 121). Comprehensive da'wa 
moulds itself to fit different situations, for example in the Nuba Mountains, it was 
associated with jihad while in much of northern Sudan, it is part of Islamic social 
planning (De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 89). 
The program reached its peak in Southern Blue Nile, home to the Ingessana people, many 
of whom had supported SPLA incursions into the area in the late 1980s. The government 
was keen to pacify the area and poured in resources, promising the area would be 
transformed (De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 90). Locals were bemused by programs 
such as mawakib al nur (Processions of Light): 
It comprised Quranic recital and memorisation, literacy classes, military service in the 
PDF camps, construction of mosques and building of schools and health centres. A 
community leader described how they grouped people into camps. 'Each village had its 
own camp. In the camp, they brought amirs who gave instmction. It started at Sam with 
prayers, reciting the Quran and Islamic orientation. It included military drill. They 
brought NIF girls to teach the women' (D^ Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 90-91). 
As part of the peace process, Taha has agreed to stand down as first vice president in favour of SPLM 
leader John Garang in late February 2005. His future role in the government is not yet clear. 
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Government development programs in contested regional areas often have multiple 
agendas. Ashworth describes the scene in Malakal, a southern regional capital in Upper 
Nile that spent much of the war years as a poorly serviced government siege town. 
Someone who had not seen Malakal for 13 years or so would be struck by the positive 
developments in the town - new air-conditioned airport buildings, electricity 24 hours a 
day, new tarmac roads, working telephones and television, a water supply for most of the 
town, a university, many new cars - a much greater investment than Wau or Juba ... But 
there is an overriding impression that one is now in an Arabic and Islamic town rather 
than a southern one. New mosques are everywhere. Local churches report that Islamic 
agencies and institutions have taken over schools and plots of land with impunity 
(Ashworth 2004: 167). 
On the other hand, people who have visited SPLM-held areas in southem Sudan speak of 
an increase in the number of churches m Bahr A1 Ghazal''' and also in the number of 
people embracing Christianity. 
However, Hoile'^ asserts that media claims of a Christian majority in the south are 
inaccurate and distort the situation. Hoile argues that Christians account for less than 
one-fifth of tiie southem population, and there "appear to be marginally more Christians 
than Muslims. Christians may comprise four per cent of the national population" (Hoile 
2003: 68-69). Media claims of a Christian south and a Christian SPLA ignore the reality 
that many southemers adhere to traditional beliefs. 
Christians in Sudan may have fears of Muslims based purely on anecdotal evidence as 
well as on the actions of the Islamist government. Says O, a Sudanese-Australian and a 
Christian, "as they despise, us, we also despise them. We don't like the way they wash 
and eat" (Levy 2004). Further, Christian missionaries may have passed on their own 
prejudices. Malwal explams that in past years: 
Comment to me in September 2004 by a Sudanese-Australian. 
David Hoile and his parent body, the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, are one of the few 
English language groups to regularly criticize established journalists and academics writing on issues such 
as politics, slavery and human rights abuses in Sudan. In return, Hoile has been denounced as a paid 
lobbyist for the Sudanese government, a supporter of a diverse range of groups including the Nicaraguan 
Contras and Mozambique's RENAMO; and his attendance at a US conference on Sudan in 2004 provoked 
demonstrations (Loeb 2004, Lowles & Silver 2000). 
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A young southerner leaving [boarding] school for vacation with his family was always 
told not to involve himself in tribal religious practices and beliefs because they were all 
evil and ungodly ... It was not too difficult to build a southern prejudice against the north 
in southern schools where the Arab role in selling and buying Africans into slavery was 
part of the history that was taught ... Southerners were sometimes told that 'these Arabs 
have bad ways that are incompatible with your good tribal ways.' So there were more 
substantial prejudices that the imperialists encouraged in the south against the north than 
southerners publicly admit (Malwal 1981: 36). 
Sudanese Coptic Christians 
There is also another group of Christians in Sudan, mainly in the north, who do not owe 
their religious allegiance to the ministrations of colonially inspired missionaries. Copts 
have played a strong role in the nation, particularly in business. The community 
numbered around 200,000 in 1995, but many have since fled to other countries, including 
Australia. 
In the past, the Copts had two bishops and more than 20 churches, spread across northern 
towns including Dongala, Atbara, Wad Medani, Port Sudan, El Obeid and Khartoum. 
Copts have been present in Sudan for more than 1300 years, but because of their 
"advanced literacy and numeracy, their role has been more significant than their numbers 
would suggest" (Vemey et al 1995: 26). 
The Copts' "adoption of a passive, non confrontational role coupled with their light skin 
colour has helped them to avoid the worst excesses of religious and racial discrimination, 
but in recent years they have been harassed and intimidated by the NIF regime" (Vemey 
et al 1995: 26). The harassment has taken various forms such as government controls on 
business licences, forced military service, dismissal from the public service and 
confiscation of Christian schools (Vemey et al 1995:26). 
In February 1991, a Coptic Sudan Airways pilot - and son of a Coptic priest - was 
executed for illegal possession of foreign currency, a restriction that was dropped soon 
after (Vemey et al 1995: 26). He had refused an offer of a pardon and money if he 
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converted to Islam - the incident was enough to prompt many Copts to pack their bags 
and leave Sudan permanently (Vemey et al 1995: 26). 
Inside Sudan, the Copts are viewed as a community that keeps to itself, another factor 
which some feel could have led to feelings of persecution. Says S, a Sudanese-Australian 
of Coptic background: "I never felt discriminated against because of religion, while 
Copts themselves are feeling this religious discrimination. Maybe when you look at me, I 
look like a north Sudanese. Copts live in a ghetto, they are not open with the Sudanese 
community, therefore they feel discrimination" (Levy 2005). 
But S went on to discuss an area of Omdurman'^ where Copts had lived since 1818, 
before the Mahdiya, where they had been accepted as Sudanese. "During the 90s, when 
Islam was high, we were discriminated against. [There was] an external influence on 
these people - government, propaganda, teachers, schools - people felt Christians were 
foreigners" (Levy 2005). S argued this was part of the government's divide and rule 
policy, passed down from the British, "problems were created by the regime to eliminate 
powerful economic tribes in the way of the Islamic Front" (Levy 2005). 
Noble spiritual beliefs 
There is another group often mentioned in dispatches but whose actual voices are seldom 
heard in much of the recent literature about Sudan - with the notable exception of Deng. 
Animists/theists/people with noble spiritual beliefs are close to invisible in news articles 
about southern Sudan. Yet, in a 1995 report. Amnesty International noted that "most of 
the rural population follow their own religious traditions" (Amnesty 1995: 5). 
Rarely do we fmd any discussion of how these people would wish to see their country 
governed. Southerners who are educated tend to espouse Christianity, at least publicly. 
Greater Khartoum consists of Three Towns arranged around the confluence o f the Blue and White Niles: 
Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, the seat of the Mahdiya. 
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and whatever they may feel about the beliefs of their parents or grandparents or cousins, 
it is not widely discussed in print as a viable alternative to an Islamic political tradition. 
Languages in schools 
Communication is a crucial issue and one of the most sensitive topics concerns the use of 
Arabic and English in the south and the transitional areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and 
Southern Blue Nile and which language should be the lingua franca. Many southerners 
want initial schooling to be in their mother tongue - be it Bari or Collo, Madi or Zande, 
moving to English or Arabic pattern schooling later on. Ideally, a student would then 
acquire proficiency in mother tongue and either English or Arabic, plus a working 
knowledge of the other language they did not major in. 
In the north, English is also popular as a second language and viewed as the language for 
getting ahead in banking and other business. "Our boss told us that anyone who did not 
learn English would lose their job in a few years," said a Sudanese bank officer.'^ 
Agaw notes that Arabic has been spread throughout the south by merchants and many 
southerners speak Arabic, or its close cousin, Juba Arabic. "Even inside the SPLM, the 
language is Arabic in all fields of communication. You are in no need to use a tank to 
force people to adopt a specific language as languages normally compete with each 
other^' (Agaw 1996: 6). 
But employing teachers for the south and for far flung regional areas has been a problem. 
Malwal notes that around 1974-75, many southern schools were closed due to lack of 
teachers (Malwal 1981: 229). "Large numbers of northern Sudanese teachers who had 
been transferred to the south to teach Arabic had refused to go and there were no southem 
teachers to replace them" (Malwal 1981: 229). 
" Comment made to me in Khartoum in 2004. 
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Likewise, expatriate teachers keen to work in southern Sudan as part of a national 
government scheme in the 1980s told me they had real difficulty in getting government 
permission to fly to their posts. Only a chance meeting with a relative of then First Vice 
President Joseph Lagu led to intervention by the former Anyanya chief to resolve the 
impasse. On arrival in the south, the problems continued with salaries frequently delayed 
or never arriving at all. 
Ethnic politics and abuse of human rights 
In Sudan, Islam has fallen hostage to Arab racism and ethnic politics and the NIF lacks a 
strategy for "reconciling political and ethnic plurality," argue De Waal and Abdel Salaam 
(De Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 98). They maintain rural minorities - such as the Fur, 
Masalit and Berti of Darfiir; the Baggara Arabs of Kordofan and Darfiir and the Beja of 
the east - are the most devout and have the strongest history of militant Mahdism (De 
Waal & Abdel Salaam 2004: 99). 
Arab neo-ftindamentalists commonly regard some of these rural groups' practices as un-
Islamic and part of the program of Islamic social practices was to cure what the da'waist 
agency Al Ithar Al Khairiya (altruism or purity) called 'social cavities,' by, for example, 
sponsoring mass [male] circumcision ceremonies among uncircumcised Beja. Many 
Beja themselves were driven to take up arms against the government, citing the 
government's repression of their form of Islam. Devout neo-fundamentalists from the 
Beja and other non-Arab groups reject the NIF assaults as racist (De Waal & Abdel 
Salaam 2004: 99). 
There were similar clashes between the government and the Nuba people of southem 
Kordofan. The Nuba number about 1.5 million people and include Muslims, Christians 
and followers of traditional religions. They are a collection of ethnic groups speaking 
more than 50 related languages and live in the picturesque hills named for them, the Nuba 
Mountains (Amnesty 1995: 78). 
Their tragedy is that they live on the fault line between north and south, a divide that also 
delineates Dinka and Misseriya areas such as Abyei and the Ingessana homeland of 
Southem Blue Nile. "Neglected and discriminated against by successive governments in 
Khartoum, many Nuba sympathised with the southern-led rebellion of the SPLA in the 
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early 1980s. In 1985, civil unrest ignited in the Nuba Mountains between units of the 
SPLA and local Arab militia. Since then, the region has been one of the fronts in Sudan's 
civil war" (De Waal 2001: 117-118). 
In Amnesty's words, "many Nuba claim that of all the peoples in Sudan who regard 
themselves as Africans they are the most exposed to the possible political and cultural 
domination of the Arab north" (Amnesty 1995: 78). Thousands have been killed and tens 
of thousands forced to move to govemment-controlled 'peace villages' (Amnesty 1995: 
78). 
Women have been raped, women and children abducted. The destruction of homes, grain 
stores, livestock and crops has created a famine in rural areas, deliberately exacerbated by 
military action to sever areas not under government control from the outside world. 
Hundreds of Nuba leaders and political activists have been arrested (Amnesty 1995: 78). 
The nature of Nuba culture is an affront to the Khartoum government and the Islamist 
project, argues de Waal: 
Here were a people who embraced diversity and tolerance, for whom the right to practice 
their cultural traditions was highly valued and seen as quite compatible with following 
revealed religion. Many specific Nuba practices, such as public nudity and various forms 
of dancing, were seen as primitive and uncivilised by Sudanese Muslims from Khartoum 
and especially so by Islamists (De Waal 2001: 122). 
A massacre of Dinka people by Rizeigat people in the northem town of Ed Dhein in 1987 
is a well known and well documented example of Sudanese racism at its most vicious. 
Hundreds of Dinka were burnt alive in railway carriages by local Rizeigat (including 
men, women and children) after they sought refiige with the police from violence in the 
town. 
Academics Mahmud and Baldo investigated reports of the massacre and published a frill 
report in Arabic (and later in English) that was widely distributed. Inevitably, they also 
suflfered jail and other harassments for their bravery. They explained that the scene for 
the atrocities had been set much earlier: 
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When the massacre occurred, Dhein was not a quiet, peaceful or harmonious town. Its 
society was impregnated with the forces and elements of the massacre. Religious 
fanaticism was on the rise. Competition over resources and services started to be played 
along ethnic lines. A new Rizeigat ethnic identity was being mobilised against other 
identities. Thuggery and disdain for convention and law became common among the 
Rizeigat youth. The social fabric of the Rizeigat community started to disintegrate. There 
was a generational conflict between the old and the young and class conflict between the 
haves and the have nots - these mainly young. And there were political divisions. These 
conflicts interacted with ethnic violence, armed banditry and slavery to generate the 
psychosis necessary for the massacre. The church in Dhein was the focus of religious 
fanaticism, competition over land and irrational suspicion. In 1986, some 400 Dhein 
Muslims signed a petition to the judge asking for the removal of the church from the 
town (Mahmud & Baldo 1987: 31) 
But the Rizeigat were not the only group carrying out atrocities. Africa Watch outlines 
the gruesome activities of the Missiriya militia, some of whom were armed by the 
government and tasked with protecting Chevron's oilfields at Bentiu (Afiica Watch 1990: 
88): 
The pattern of a raid by the Misseriya murahileen is essentially similar to that of the 
Rizeigat. Villages are surrounded, people shot as they escape, burned in their houses, or 
are captured and executed, by shooting, burning, beating or drowning. Women and 
children are taken as captives. Men are castrated. Houses, grain stores and trees are 
destroyed. Cattle are taken (Africa Watch 1990: 88). 
The Misseriya also harassed Nuer famine migrants and became active in the Nuba 
Mountains in 1988. The group devastated Dinka areas in north-east Bahr A1 Ghazal, 
killing tens of thousands of civilians, but there has been no oflBcial investigation into their 
activities (Africa Watch 1990: 89-91). 
Afiica Watch asserts that these activities resulted from a change of stance during the late 
1980s by Sadiq A1 Mahdi, when he repositioned himself from a "secular, Hberal 
statesman to the fundamentalist aspiring Imam of the Ansar" (Africa Watch 1990: 19). 
"The old Mahdist alliance of Khartoum traders and western Baggara nomads reasserted 
itself: the former dictated the economic policy while the latter were given automatic 
weapons and a licence to attack and plunder Dinka populations in the south" (Afiica 
Watch 1990: 19). 
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Equatorian concerns 
Sadiq A1 Mahdi also fuelled local disputes, especially Equatorian fears of Nilotic 
domination (Africa Watch 1990:19). 
In the complex ethnic politics of Equatoria, tribes have often been pitted against their 
neighbours, with local conflicts often determining who sides with the government and 
who supports the SPLA. The government exploited this situation to arm and organise 
militias, as did the SPLA (Africa Watch 1990: 158). 
Equatorians see themselves as closest to East Africa and many of the border tribes such 
as Madi and Acholi have relatives settled in Uganda. A Sudanese-Australian from 
Equatoria explains: 
The north is very far, their politics don't reach East Africa. We used to study in East 
Africa, we don't know Arabic well. But Dinka interact with northerners, they can live 
together no problem. Racism is there. We grew up like this, all Sudanese, this exists in 
everybody's heart. People in Equatoria love each other, but they don't like Dinka 
because of fighting over cattle between Dinka and Equatorians. Everybody also does not 
like the north, even Dinka is better than the north (Levy 2005) 
There are legitimate concerns that intra-southem tensions may mar the peace process. 
However, while fiirther Equatorian-Dinka tensions may be yet to come, Nuer-Dinka 
fighting surely reached its peak during the split between two rival factions of the SPLA. 
SPLA commanders in Upper Nile, Dr Riek Machar (Nuer) and Dr Lam Akol (Collo), 
split from the main group in August 1991, forming SPLA-Nasir, later known as SPLA-
United. War broke out almost immediately between the two groups, with factions 
increasingly divided along ethnic lines, the Nasir group dominated by the Nuer, with 
SPLA-Mainstream led by the Dinka, Dr John Garang. 
Anmesty notes both SPLA groups committed gross abuses of human rights, creating 
famine, killing villagers and exploiting ethnic tensions (Amnesty 1995: 89). 
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Slavery 
To add to Sudan's woes and in particular those of the south, there has been a return to 
slavery, usually among displaced or otherwise vulnerable groups. The effects of the 
slaving raids of past centuries fiiels poor relations even today, as Niblock outlines: 
The disruption to southern societies caused by slave raids emanating from northem Sudan 
- continuing over many centuries, but reaching its climax in the mid-nineteenth century -
created a lasting racial antagonism on the part of the Negroid southerners towards the 
Arabs of northem Sudan (Niblock 1987: 149). 
Now, the practice has been revived, starting around 1987, when stories surfaced about 
Dinka women and children enslaved by the Baggara of Kordofan and Darflir, along with 
accounts of kidnapping, captivity and forced labour amounting to slavery in SPL A areas 
(Africa Watch 1990: 139). Mahmud and Baldo blame the government for the return of 
slavery, saying the government policy of "arming Rizeigat militias and sending them into 
Dinka areas has created favourable conditions for the re-emergence of slavery" (Mahmud 
& Baldo 1987: 30). 
However Africa Watch urges caution, arguing that Arab-Dinka relations are complex and 
not all Baggara Arabs are slavers. It notes Arab women seem opposed to the practice and 
"have often helped Dinka girls escape or given information to Dinka parents or others 
who are trying to locate captives" (Africa Watch 1995:150). 
The issue of slavery has also been controversial in other ways, wdth some critics 
denouncing the work of Swiss agency Christian Solidarity hitemational which raises 
money to buy back slaves. Hoile is one of the most fervent critics, suggesting that those 
presenting as slaves may have been coached in how to act and what stories to tell (Hoile 
2003: 83). 
The debate about the most efficacious way of stamping out slavery is for another arena, 
however there can be absolutely no doubt the cruel trade does exist, whether it is called 
forced labour or slavery (Anti-Slavery Society 1999: 1). As recently as 2003, researchers 
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from the Rift Valley Institute conducted a survey of Bahr A1 Ghazal to determine the 
extent of the practice. They walked and cycled, carrying questionnaires, clipboards and 
mosquito nets and recorded the age, gender, village and clan of missing people, as well as 
the circumstances of their abduction (BBC May 28, 2003). They found that more than 
11,000 people had been abducted and while some may have found their way to camps for 
internally displaced people, it was reasonable to assume many were taken into captivity 
in the north (BBC May 28,2003). 
Slavery has a racial base and whether there be scams as well, whether some 'slaves' are 
'pawns' - children 'loaned' by destitute families to do work around the home or farm 
until they can be bought back - does not detract from the clear racial element in the whole 
sorry saga. 
It is this rampant racism which makes Sudan so vulnerable to rumour and intrigue, to 
cruel stories designed to cause trouble and inflame tensions. "In Sudan, it's like a class 
system, first class are Arab Muslims, second class are African Muslims, the rest are third 
class. If you become a Muslim and you speak Arabic, you are an Arab anyway. 
Uneducated Muslims are being manipulated," is the view of J, a Sudanese-Australian 
from the south (Levy 2004). 
Sidahmed says that at independence, uneven development in the south was fixrther 
complicated by racism and religion: 
Rampant racism demonstrated itself in the attitude of most of the northerners to the 
southerners. This was rooted in the history of the slave trade and slave institutions ... The 
educated southerners, who eventually led the political activity of the south, were products 
of the Christian missionary acculturation and were essentially secular in their political 
outlook, unlike the educated northerners who were essentially conformist to their Muslim 
tradition (Sidahmed 1996: 53). 
The inequality extends to the political system with southerners effectively ineligible for 
the top post of president. In Rothchild's view, northemers dominate and their "general 
unwillingness to apply the proportionality principle for selecting cabinet ministers has 
contributed significantly to tiie conflict" (Rothchild 1997: 64-65). Civilian and military 
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governments have displayed different coalition-building tendencies, he says. Under 
Abboud, 7.6 per cent of cabinet ministers were southerners (yearly average), under 
Nimieri, 7.2 per cent, while civilian governments scored 14 per cent and appointed more 
southerners to influential ministerial positions, he argues (Rothchild 1997: 64-65). 
Under Bashir, only two of the 13 northern Sudanese in the government were neither 
members nor sympathisers of the Muslim Brothers, while one of the three southemers 
was active in the NTF {Guardian Weekly, July 30, 1989, cited in Rothchild 1997: 65). 
"Bashir remained part of the exclusivist military tradition, limiting the participation of an 
effective southern opposition voice and gravely complicating the process of developing 
effective rules and routines for political cooperation," asserts Rothchild (Rothchild 1997: 
65). 
Power-sharing is a feature of the recent peace agreement (see Chapter 5), but many 
problems could have been avoided if the north had been committed to equality with the 
south from the beginning, says Agaw. 
Cultures of the north and their southern counterparts are closer to each other than cultures 
of the neighbouring countries. A believer in Arab descent in Sudan knows that his 
brother in the south is much closer to him than any Arab of another country, even if he is 
accustomed to look down on the former or to fight against him. An ideal usage of these 
cultures and their backgrounds during the transitional period might affect positively 
attitudes of people of the south (Agaw 1996: 5). 
A proposed southern House of Nationalities provides a breath of fresh air in the debate. 
At a Swiss-sponsored seminar for southern intellectuals held in the Kenyan hills in 
November 2000, Professor Barri Ngagara Wanji put forward the idea of a forum "where 
all the nationalities found in the south Sudan could meet on a regular basis in order to 
discuss their problems" (Akol 2003: 20). This led to the idea of a House of Nationalities 
that could be advisory or legislative, address issues of gender in future governance and 
would aim above all to resolve conflict and foster peace among southern Sudanese (Akol 
2003: 20). Subsequent discussions m Nairobi indicated some support from the SPLM for 
creating a legislative upper house along the lines of the House of Nationalities (SPLM 
2003:20). 
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Conclusion 
The House of Nationalities as proposed is purely a southern initiative. But the benefits of 
such an approach could be just as useful in the north, as to date, political relations 
between north and south, Arabs and Afiicans, Muslims and Christians, have been 
characterised by fear and loathing. 
Race and religion have been useful tools for creating cleavages in the Sudanese identity, 
an identity that in any case was a colonial invention. For many Sudanese, the first 
contact their ancestors had with either north or south came in the context of the slave 
trade. If one had been a buyer or user of other humans as slaves, arguably viewing these 
slaves as sub-human made the deal 'permissible.' If one had been enslaved, all the 
attributes of the slaver - their physical looks, characteristics and religious beliefs - could 
become repulsive. 
But the bloodshed that has ensued, the continual abuse of human rights followed by 
denial of any problems by govenmient and at times, the SPLM, really beggars belief. 
Much of the bloodshed in recent years has focused on access to oil fields. Again, the 
government's scorched earth approach, their desire to get the oil out at all costs, fails to 
take into account the fact that they have been shelling out US $1 million a day to 
continue fighting the war. The government's inability to develop more inclusive policies 
and to construct more subtle ways of encouraging people to come to Islam, demonstrates 
lack of foresight and lack of imagination. It is also an indication the government receives 
poor advice and suffers from a serious lack of leadership. 
In the international arena, the government's insistence on presenting Sudan as an Arab 
nation rather than focusing on its position as the largest country in Afiica displays a 
cultural cringe of the highest degree. Sudan has a common religion with the Arab world 
and a common language, but surely it can take pride in its own unique and wonderfial 
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cultural blend rather than desperately trying for acceptance as a second tier Arab nation. 
Sudan no longer needs Arab wealth, but there is no sign the government will shift 
position in this regard. 
When it comes to religion, Turabi and the Islamists have missed the chance to give the 
world a modem interpretation of Islam that shows how Muslims can truly accommodate 
other faiths on an equal basis. The opportunity was there and certainly Turabi had the 
intellectual rigour, but the sheer racist nature of the society in which he lives appears to 
have made such developments both unnecessary and unwanted. 
The SPLM has also feiled to deliver on its promise of a New Sudan, at least in times of 
war, by failing to address concerns that it is dominated by the main southem tribe, the 
Dinka. What a simple trap to fall into and surely one that could have been avoided. 
There is a danger this could backfire further down the track during the initial peace 
period, when rumours designed to unseat the peace process are likely to abound. It will 
be easy for an agent provocateur to spread malicious gossip aimed at fostering problems 
between Nilotics and Equatorians. It will be far more difiBcult to counteract these stories 
once they are common parlance in the cities and villages of southem Sudan and in the 
north. 
Muslim northemers need to ensure that they are part of the debate in the English 
language as well as in Arabic if they want to engage with the south. Southerners write 
overwhelmingly in English and in some senses, therefore, they tend to dominate the 
international discourse. On the other hand, the issue of English and Arabic pattern 
schools is vitally important and while southerners may understandably be keen to study 
in English, they should beware of rejecting the opportunity to gain superior Arabic skills. 
Over and over again, ethnicity in Sudan has been a basis for rape, murder, torture, 
abduction and slavery. This is a brutal way to run a society and counter productive in the 
extreme. The pattern of past decades is now being played out yet again in Darfiir. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TERROR IN DARFUR 
Introduction 
It was in late 2003 that reports about the bloodshed in Darflir began appearing in the 
media. By mid-2004, interest in the area was reaching a fever pitch, with television 
screens everywhere filled with footage of women in vividly coloured tobes'^ struggling 
through whirling dust storms. The United Nations was forced to put pressure on the 
Sudanese government as aid workers faced delays for permits to visit the stricken area of 
western Sudan. 
The uproar became a cacophony that was heard even in Khartoum, where state-owned 
Omdurman Television ran footage showing special police forces in their blue camouflage 
uniforms arriving in the area to restore law and order. Northern Sudanese in the capital 
bowed their heads in horror: this was a tragedy involving Muslim Sudanese, not those 
irrepressible people in the south. For any Sudanese steeped in a tradition of their culture 
as warm and hospitable, decent and God-fearing, Darfur poses a mental dilemma. "This 
is not part of our culture," lamented a Sudanese aid worker,'^ in other words: how can 
this be happening in my country, how can I live with this shame? 
The trials and tribulations of Darfur have many similarities with the situation in the south 
and areas like the Nuba Mountains over past decades. The difference here is that unlike 
the people of the previously mentioned areas, the people of Darfur are overwhelmingly 
MusUms, albeit from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. The other difference is that the 
television cameras have been able to get close enough to record the misery of the 
displaced. 
" Sudanese Muslim women wrap themselves sari-style in voluminous lengths o fvo i l e called lobes. 
" Comment made to me in Kordofan, August 2004. 
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It is by looking at the history of the area and the way the bloody campaign has been 
conducted that it is finally very clear that the problems of Sudan centre around ethnic 
cleavages rather than religion alone. To understand what is happening in Darfiir, we need 
to look back before the two civil wars, back before independence and the condominium, 
to the earliest recorded history of this interesting region. 
History 
Darfur means home or place of the Fur people. But in fact there are a number of 'dar' in 
the region, as this westem part of Sudan borders Chad and Libya and is home to around 
seven million people of varying ethnic origins. 
The region has three distinct ecological zones. The central region covers Jebel Marra 
(Marra Mountains), a beautiful and fertile area farmed by settled Afiican tribes, including 
the Fur, Berti, Bargu, Nergid, Tama and Tunjur. The northern region is actually part of 
the Sahara desert and is home to camel-owning nomads, including the non-Arab Zayadia, 
Zaghawa and Bedeyat and the Arab Mahariya, Irayqat, Mahamid and Beni Hussein. 
Ecologically fi-agile, it is most vulnerable of the three areas to drought. The eastem and 
southern regions are less affected by drought and are home to nomadic cattle herders 
fi-om the Rizeigat, Misseriya, Habbaniya, Beni Halba, Taaisha and Maaliyya. The area 
also has a large urban population, including traders, government officials and 
professionals (Ashworth 2005: 160, Vemey et al 1995:29). 
Darfur was an independent Muslim sultanate, known variously as the Fur or Keira 
sultanate, from the fifteenth century until 1916, when it became part of the Anglo-
Egyptian condominium (Lesch 1998: 18, Holt & Daly 1979: 36-37). Located between 
the Baggara^^ people m the south and the camel Arabs of the north, it was one of a 
number of non-Arab enclaves (Holt & Daly 1979: 7). "Although surrounded by a flood 
of immigrant Arab tribes, [the Fur] succeeded in establishing a dynastic Muslim state" 
Cattle nomads, from baqar, Arabic for cow. 
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(Holt & Daly 1979: 8). Lesch notes the Fur controlled major desert routes, intermingling 
for centuries with "migrants from West Africa, Arab traders and holy men from the Nile 
Valley and other indigenous peoples. Pride in their special history and culture remains 
strong among the Fur" (Lesch 1998: 18). 
The sultanate was at its peak in the early 1800s under Abdel Rahman A1 Rashid, 
described by the European traveller WG Browne as "a man rather under the middle size, 
of a complexion adust or dry, with eyes fiill of fire and features abounding in expression 
... he possesses much alertness and activity" (cited in Holt & Daly 1979: 41). The 
sultanate made a permanent home east of Jebel Marra at El Fasher and Islam was well-
embedded, with holy men granted land and providing religious teachers and clerks to the 
court (Holt & Daly 1979: 41). 
At the fall of the Mahdist state in 1889, Ali Dinar became sultan, but relations 
deteriorated with the Condominium as he did not get assistance to defend his area against 
the French in the west. In 1916, the town of El Fasher was under threat from a force of 
around 3000 Sudan government troops positioned in neighbouring Kordofan province, 
supported by three aeroplanes (Holt & Daly 1979: 128). Despite the heat and lack of 
water, the troops advanced to within 12 miles of El Fasher, a battle ensued and the Fur 
withdrew, Ali Dinar escaped but was killed some months later. By 1919, the British had 
signed a bolder agreement with the French (Holt & Daly 1979:128-9). 
Nomadic herders continued armed raids on agricultural areas and skirmishes with rival 
groups, part of their way of life and "a survival strategy in the face of natural calamity 
and threatened destitution" (Vemey et al 1995: 29). But as time went on, the attacks 
became more intense, shifting from small outbreaks in the 1950s to 1970s to large battles 
by the mid-1980s. Early clashes were between nomads over grazing rights and water 
access or animal theft (Vemey et al 1995: 29). 
In Darftir in the 1970s, a linguistic profile found that 55 per cent spoke Arabic, 21 per 
cent Fur and others spoke Masalit, Zaghawa and West African languages (Lesch 1998: 
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20). But the government attitude towards local languages was not encouraging, as this 
Sudanese-Australian from Darfur explains: 
I was bom in [the seventies], I grew up on the border with Chad, Sudan and Libya. I am 
Zaghawa, my mother and father speak different languages, it is a traditional culture and 
Arabic is not my first language. For my first three years at school, 1 was beaten more 
than 1000 times because I spoke my native language. That sort of discrimination made 
me feel I hated Arabs (Levy 2005). 
Ashworth notes that nomads, semi-nomads and farmers had lived together in the era for a 
long time, settling localised disputes by traditional means (Ashworth 2005: 160). He 
argues it was not until the early 1980s that clashes began along ethnic lines (Ashworth 
2005: 160). The area was hit hard by the drought of 1984-85 and thousands died of 
starvation. "The ecological devastation and its consequences for the population is one of 
the root causes of the current situation besides the ethnic factor and the political 
situation" (Ashworth 2005: 160). 
The drought also forced some Zaghawa nomads into urban centres where they worked as 
petty traders. Those who remained in rural areas received a hostile reception from Fur 
farmers and they were also accused of camel rustling by the military (Vemey 1995: 30). 
The Zaghawa were made unwelcome by Fur in local govemment and the police and army 
burned Zaghawa settlements and executed Zaghawa leaders (Vemey et al 1995: 30). In 
what could be classed as a forerunner of the current conflict, Vemey notes: 
The element of racial prejudice became further entwined with the environmental roots of 
the conflict with the formation of an alliance of 27 Arab nomad tribes and their 
declaration of war against the Zurug (black) and non-Arab groups of Darllir. The 
response of the Fur was to form their own militias, at first for self defence and later as 
part of a short-lived but significant linkage with the SPLA (Vemey et al 1995: 30). 
The area was an Umma Party stronghold and Umma leader Sadiq Al Mahdi began 
arming Arab groups in Darfur and Kordofan, mainly Baggara and Rizeigat, to fight the 
southerners around 1987. "More arms came into the region as a fall-out of the war in 
Chad in the late 1980s. Illicit arms trade from the Central African Republic, Libya and 
southern Sudan added to the problem" (Ashworth 2005: 160). 
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With the change of government in 1989, the NIF wanted to "silence and remove civilians 
of African heritage from the zones just north of the southern provinces ... a cordon 
sanitaire to protect the cultural and religious purity" (Lesch 1998: 161). Official fatwas 
claimed any Muslim fighting the regime was guilty of apostasy and also legitimised 
attacks on Nuba, Ingessana and Fur peoples (Lesch 1998: 162). 
But even before President Bashir took power, in 1988 two Darflirian NIF politicians had 
defected from the party, accusing the leadership of racism. One was Daud Bolad, an NIF 
member since his student days and a former coordinator in Darfiir. First joining the 
Democratic Unionist Party, Bolad subsequently jumped ship to the SPLA, accusing the 
NIF of Arabism (De Waal 2004: 98). By December 1991, Bolad was heading a small 
SPLA group in Darfiar, but the unit was defeated and Bolad disappeared after being 
captured by Darflir Governor, Colonel Tayeb Ibrahim, also known as sikha (iron bar). 
Ironically, Tayeb had been Bolad's former bodyguard in his student days with the NIF 
(De Waal 2004: 98). 
Meanwhile, the Sudanese government signed an integration treaty with Libya in 1990 
that promoted Arabic language and culture in Darfiir; later that year, at least 90 Fur chiefe 
were arrested for trying to stop attacks on their villages by government-supported Arab 
militia (Lesch 1998: 162). Reports continued through the decade of armed militias 
known as Janjaweed (men on horses) raiding villages of African tribes in Darfiir and 
thousands of villagers fled into Chad (Ashworth 2005:160). 
Ashworth notes that Darfiir, like everywhere in Sudan except for Khartoum and the 
agricultural Ge2dra region, is politically marginalised and severely underdeveloped: 
"There is a lack of infrastructure, lack of investment in both physical and human 
resources, absence of basic services, rare employment opportunities and the proliferation 
of small arms are characteristics of this situation" (Ashworth 2005: 160). 
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Administrative reorganisation in 1994 appears to have increased ethnic tensions. Human 
Rights Watch notes that the move by President Bashir "gave members of Arab ethnic 
groups new positions of power, which the Masalit, like their Fur and Zaghawa 
neighbours, saw as attempt to undermine their traditional leadership role and the power of 
their communities in their homeland" (Human Rights Watch May 2004: 6). 
Allegiance to Islam 
The Darfimans have a strong connection with their area and are proud of their rich 
heritage, including their early allegiance to Islam. "We are Muslim more than the Arabs, 
Islam in Darfiir is earlier than [anywhere in Sudan]" - commented a Sudanese-Australian 
fi-om Darflir (Levy 2005). 
But Muslim traditions m Darflir may owe more to West Africa than the Nile Valley, there 
is a large Muslim West African population known as Fellata, who have Hausa and Fulani 
origins (De Waal 2004: 77-78). 
These black, non-Arab Darfurians and Fellata Muslims emerged as a significant Islamist 
constituency in the 1980s and 90s and their Islamist orthodoxy was a challenge to 
implicit assumption of the Nile Valley Islamists that Islamism is coterminous whh 
Arabism (De Waal 2004: 77-78). 
The ruling Fur and Fulani femilies claim descent from the prophet and those with Islamist 
leanings had little quarrel with Turabi's Islamic project (De Waal 2004: 77-78). 
However, Lesch notes that in Sudan, "people who have virtually no Arab blood call 
themselves Arab by virtue of an adopted lineage that they trace symbolically to the 
Prophet or to important Arab dynasties and tribes" (Lesch 1998: 211). In this way, 
people may acquire a perceived elevated social status. 
The racial divide between "riverain Arabs and western blacks" in the NIF was 
highlighted in the 1999 split between Bashir and Turabi (De Waal 2004: 77-78). De 
Waal argues: 
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The critique of the westerners was framed entirely in terms of the riverain elite's 
monopoly on power, making no reference to any Islamic precepts. The racial aspect of 
the encounter between 'Arab' and 'African' Islamisms remains untheorised, both in the 
parties' embrace and in their dissension. Indeed, Islamists cannot theorise this encounter, 
because they do not recognise any plurality in Islam or Islamism, instead insisting that in 
any disagreement, one party must be deviating from true Islam (De Waal 2004: 78). 
Two types of conflict 
The conflicts that arose in Darflir in 2003 had been bubbling under the surface for many 
years, ignored and at times inflamed by the central government with its policy of arming 
Arab tribesmen. The International Crisis Group (ICG) argues there had been two distinct 
types of conflict: sporadic, traditional conflicts over resources that exhibited a low level 
of violence and the ethnically driven clashes that emerged in the late 1980s (ICG March 
2004: 5). These conflicts were especially fierce and additional parties began to be drawn 
in, "fighters began identifying themselves more broadly as Arab or non-Arab for the first 
time in the 1987-1989 conflict between the Fur and the Arabs" (ICG March 2004: 5). 
The ICG argues the government had been arming Arab tribes in central and northern 
Sudan since the 1980s, to destabilise the SPLA and ensure the southern rebellion would 
not spread (ICG March 2004:5). The tactic had worked in the south, where regional, 
tribal and political divisions were exploited to create southern militia to secure the 
oilfields and fight the SPLA. Ashworth says that low level conflict continued until 2003, 
when "a number of interacting factors, including ethnic conflict, an increase in armed 
robberies and a perception of Darfur marginalisation, led to the formation of two political 
and military resistance movements, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 
and the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM)" (Ashworth 2005: 160). 
While these movements have made political demands, the government has called them 
bandits and ignored their political agenda (Ashworth 2005: 160). It is all depressingly 
familiar - when the SPLA first began attacking government posts in the mid-1980s, the 
government news agency SUNA would also refer to army operations that had 
successfiilly "mopped up bandits." 
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The government has repeatedly been accused of rallying the Janjaweed to quash the SLM 
and the JEM after they attacked military targets in 2003 (Associated Press October 21, 
2004). BBC reporter in Khartoum, Alfred Taban, says that "the number of Janjaweed is 
reported to be very small, maybe a few thousand, but they are well armed with automatic 
weapons and ride well-fed horses and camels" (BBC April 10, 2004). It is believed that 
many of the men received military training in Libya in the 1980s, as part of Gaddafi's 
Islamic Legion of north and west Afiican mercenaries (BBC April 10,2004). 
Khartoum denies involvement; however Arab militia leaders, including the prominent 
Musa Hilal, maintains that the government "asked Arab tribes to help combat the rebels," 
while US and UN oflBcials "point to alleged coordination by Sudan's military and the 
Arab militia" (Associated Press October 21, 2004). There are widespread reports of 
Sudan Air Force planes bombing or harassing non-Arab villages as part of an 
orchestrated campaign in conjunction with army and militia raids. 
Human Rights Watch reports that villages are generally targeted on the basis of ethnicity, 
with Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit villages bumed while nearby hamlets belonging to other 
tribes remain untouched. "The intact villages sometimes belong to Arab and other non-
Zaghawa, non-Masalit or non-Fur African ethnic groups" (Human Rights Watch April 
2004: 22). 
Both rebel groups say they want more power and resources for Darfur. The SLM is 
believed to be the larger of the two rebel groups, consisting mainly of the nomadic, 
Afiican Zaghawa tribe, while the JEM is linked to Hassan A1 Turabi; the US estimates 
that the latter has around 1000 fighters (Associated Press October 21, 2004). 
The ICG has noted that Turabi's Popular National Congress distributed The Black Book, 
a pamphlet claiming the ruling party was blocking Darfririans and minority groups from 
holding senior public servant positions. It listed senior officials by rank, ethnicity and 
region, stating party members from riverain northern Sudan, particularly Shaigiya and 
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Jaaliyin Arabs, were favoured (ICG June 25, 2003: 12). "These charges risked 
introducing ethnicity as a more powerful factor in northern Sudanese politics than ever 
before, while giving Western governments and disaffected minority groups a new card 
against the Islamists" (ICG June 25, 2003: 12). Adding fuel to the fire of the theme of 
Turabi's links with the JEM and support for a new non-Arab thrust. Human Rights Watch 
reports that a rumour was circulating with the "new-found 'fact' that Turabi is not really 
an Arab" (Human Rights Watch April 2004: 11). 
World's worst humanitarian crisis 
In the meantime, the scorched earth policy and harassment campaign has destroyed at 
least 400 villages, killed 70,000 people or more and sent more than one million people 
scurrying around the region in search of sanctuary. This includes around 200,000 people 
who have sought refuge in hastily thrown together camps in neighbouring Chad 
(Associated Press October 21, 2004). The stories of rape, murder, pillage and plunder, 
branding of women, torching of homes and grain have poured out of the region along 
with its former inhabitants. 
The vast majority of the dead are black Aliicans (BBC November 14, 2004). But militia 
leader Musa Hilal says deaths in the region are simply repercussions of war. "The rebels 
started this war. They started burning and destroying many of the villages. They started 
destroying our villages first," he said (BBC November 14, 2004). 
Human Rights Watch notes the Darflir conflict has deep roots, but says there are key 
differences with prior bouts of fighting: 
The current conflict has developed serious racial and ethnic overtones and clearly risks 
shattering historic if fragile patterns of coexistence. A number of ethnic groups 
previously neutral are now positioning themselves along the Arab/African divide, 
aligning and cooperating with either the rebel movements or the govemment and its 
allied militia. Remaining neutral and outside the conflict is becoming impossible 
(Human Rights Watch April 2004: 8). 
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But Sudan's Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail has denied links between the 
government and the Janjaweed, simply saying "you have no evidence" (BBC, November 
14,2004). 
Africa Confidential newsletter maintains that the government is employing a NIF 
technique honed in the south and the Nuba Mountains, using proxy militias to do its dirty 
work and at the same time, inflaming local grievances (Africa Confidential November 19, 
2004: 6). "Darfiir's Janjaweed killers are a prime example: Khartoum's line that it can't 
control them is still parroted by governments, despite ample evidence to the contrary, 
including from cautious UN investigators" (Afiica Confidential November 19, 2004: 6). 
The newsletter also notes that UN officials mention, sotto voce, that the area could 
disintegrate into a Somali-style warlord zone, failing to notice "that the emphasis on 
Somalia and on regional disintegration are both propaganda lines put out for months by 
the regime itself (Afiica Confidential November 19,2004:6). 
While most of the displaced are from Afiican tribes, "it would be wrong to assume that it 
is always Arabs who are the victors and Afiicans the vanquished," says Greg Barrow 
from the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) (Barrow 2004). He notes that: 
There are also displaced Arab communities, whose villages were attacked by African 
groups and who are victims of inter-African fighting. There are even parts of South 
Darfur where the WFP currently cannot work because of a dangerous traditional conflict 
between rival Arab groups (Barrow 2004) 
International uproar 
The United Nations now calls the situation in Darfur the world's worst [man-made] 
humanitarian crisis. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has visited the area, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and then US Secretary of State Colin Powell have dropped in, along 
with leaders and foreign ministers of a host of countries and numerous aid agency heads. 
Along with the visitors, a forest of reports has been produced, each one outlining in ever 
more ghastly detail the terrible crimes of the government-backed militia, the Janjaweed, 
and armed groups in the area in general. 
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In July 2004, after months of international inaction, the United Nations Security Council 
demanded that Sudan move to disarm Darfiir militias and provide a progress report 
within 30 days (UN Security Council July 30, 2004). By September 2004, the Security 
Council declared its intention to consider sanctions to get Sudan to comply with its 
security and disarmament obligations for Darfiir (UN Security Council September 9, 
2004). The push was sponsored by the United States, Germany, Romania and Britain, 
with the US representative declaring the situation in Darfiir uniquely grave and the 
largest humanitarian disaster in the world. He added: 
The text [of the resolution] reflects the wishes of delegations to recognise that the 
[Sudanese] government had met some of its obligations. But nobody should be under the 
illusion that the government had done so voluntarily ... It had done so with great 
reluctance and long delays, under significant pressure from the international community 
(UN Security Council September 9, 2004). 
There has been considerable debate as to whether or not the situation qualifies as 
genocide - the United States thinks it is genocide, but a report from a UN Commission of 
Inquiry does not agree, freeing member states from an obligation to take immediate 
action to end the bloodshed. However, UN Secretary-General Kofi Aiman said that the 
commission's report established that the Sudanese govemment and the Janjaweed are 
responsible for crimes under international law; attacks on villages, killing of civilians, 
rape, pillaging and forced displacement continued even as the inquiry was underway 
(Aiman February 1, 2005). The commission also gave the secretary-general a sealed file 
containing the names of those responsible and urged the Security Council to refer the 
matter to the hitemational Criminal Court in The Hague (Annan Febmary 1, 2005, BBC 
February 1, 2005). 
Back on the ground, Amnesty notes that security ofBcials harass Darfiirians on suspicion 
they are linked to the rebel groups, while camps for internally displaced people located 
around Khartoum are raided and people from Darfiir arrested. "There seems to be no 
reason for their arrests other than their area of origin" (Amnesty December 2004: 15). 
For those brave enough to complain to the authorities, worse fates await. When one man 
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in Dariur sought justice after his brother was executed by the armed forces, the police 
told him to go to the army, which he did, both groups asked him for large sums of money, 
he was detained by the army for 12 days, tied up and hung in a tree and beaten five times 
a day, and finally released after another brother bribed someone fi-om military 
intelligence (Amnesty December 2004: 8). 
Peace talks hosted in Abuja, Nigeria, by the Afncan Union (AU) continue despite many 
difficulties. An under-resourced team of several thousand AU peace monitors struggles 
on, unarmed and without sutlcient vehicles, helicopters or communications equipment to 
do their job to the fullest extent. Nevertheless, AU monitors say there is no doubt the 
Janjaweed is doing the government's bidding in western Sudan and it is mere semantics 
"to quibble over whether these fighters are regular military or irregular militia" (Segupta 
2004). 
The role of the AU monitors in Darfiir has come under scrutiny, especially when 
compared with an Inter-Govemmental Authority on Development (IGAD) backed 
ceasefire monitoring force in the Nuba Mountains, which Taban notes provides timely 
reports apportioning blame. 
The African Union, under whose auspices these monitors are operating, should revisit 
this issue and ensure that the whole world is told when, where and how the ceasefire in 
Darfiir is being violated and who is responsible. It should also work out a system of 
reward for the side which is complying and of punishment for violators (Taban 2004: 2). 
Government attempts to bring human rights abusers, in particular, the Janjaweed, to 
justice have been condemned as a lot of hot air. Human Rights Watch notes that 
government committees and commissions often take no action except to produce secret 
and soon-forgotten reports (Human Rights Watch November 2004: 21-22). 
IGAD has sponsored the main peace talks between government and SPLM. As part of an earlier 
ceasefire agreement for the Nuba Mountains area, they fund an unarmed international group of (mostly) ex-
military observers who follow up reports of ceasefire violations, make public reports and also coordinate 
de-mining programs in the area. 
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Meanwhile, the Sudan Embassy in Washington has become weary of reports from Darflir 
by the Washington Post correspondent Emily Wax: 
Heartbreaking pictures illustrating Ms Wax's articles unfortunately reflect all too normal 
living situations in many parts of Africa due to international sanctions or huge foreign 
debt burdens. Worse, by seeming to embrace the cause of armed insurgencies, the Post 
plays a dangerous game that encourages those working to destroy fledgling nation-states 
through anarchic terror. These are not freedom fighters, but ruthless insurgents who stop 
at nothing to achieve their ambitions (Embassy of Sudan 2004). 
Numerous sources link the SPLA to the early days of the SLA, asserts the ICG. It 
maintains the SPLA provided arms, training and strategic advice to the SLA at the onset 
of the rebellion, training "as many as 1500 Darfririans near Raja in western Bahr AJ 
Ghazal in March 2002" (ICG March 25, 2004: 20). Supplies are believed to be sent via 
Chad, although there are persistent reports of flights out of Nairobi and Uganda (ICG 
March 25,2004:20). 
Crawford believes that the United Nations Security Council won't authorise intervention 
- even an African Union-led Intervention - without Khartoum's agreement, noting the 
UN has baulked at putting an embargo on Sudan's oil export, "the only economic act that 
would have compelled Sudan's government to cease its genocidal offensive and allow in 
foreign peace keepers" (Crawford 2004: 12). Crawford supports an international 
intervention force, rather than just the African Union and he wants the force to have the 
power to make peace, not merely to keep it (Crawford 2004: 12). 
An international component will be essential, not just for logistics or specialist 
communications and airlift, but for providing the peacemaking force element. And being 
international will not make it any more provocative - after all, in Darfur being African is 
not neutral: it is enough to get you murdered. We must be clear about this: effectiveness 
requires a significant UK and/or US component (Crawford 2004: 12). 
But while foreign intervention may resolve short term conflicts in the country, including 
ending the killing and suffering of innocent people in Darfur, it will not address the 
longer-term issues of governance. The government could also consider softenmg its 
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media image as another way of demonstrating its concern. In an opinion piece in 
Khartoum Monitor, Mohamed Osman asks: 
Have you seen any picture of a Sudanese official sitting on the ground inside a displaced 
person's camp in Darfur? Did you see any Sudanese official or politician visiting the 
camp and holding or embracing an old lady in any of those camps? Of course, you have 
seen Kofi Annan coming to the Sudan? What did he do, he sat on the ground with the 
displaced persons and talked with them (Osman 2004: 3). 
The government could encourage state-run Omdurman Television to broadcast pictures 
of compassionate officials caring for the Darfiir displaced rather than endless footage of 
police in blue camouflage uniforms jumping out of pickups with guns at the ready. 
In January 2005, yet another Human Rights Watch report detailed the crimes committed 
by the Sudanese govemment in concert with the Janjaweed. "Regardless of whether 
there has been genocide, the scale and severity of the ongoing atrocities in Darfur 
demand an urgent international response," said Peter Takirambudde, Human Rights 
Watch Africa Director (Human Rights Watch January 24,2005). 
All of this took place against the backdrop of peace talks in Naivasha between the 
goverrmient and the SPLM, with the hope expressed that the main peace agreement will 
assist in finding a resolution to the Darfur crisis. 
Conclusion 
The UN's failure to call the violence in Darfiir genocide has enraged some US politicians 
who have called for UN Secretary-General Annan to sort out the mess or stand down 
(Agence France Presse Washington: Febmary 1, 2005). However Annan has said that 
sanctions are still on the table and the Security Council may have to take fiirther action 
(Associated Press February 2, 2005). 
Now a further debate has arisen over the most suitable place for hearings about the 
Darfur crimes. While the US wants to see a UN and AU tribunal established in Arusha, 
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Tanzania. The UN and countries such as Canada want the case to be heard by the 
already-established International Criminal Court in The Hague (Agence France Presse 
Ottawa: February 1, 2005, Washington February 1, 2005). However the debate is 
somewhat artificial as Sudan's first vice president, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, insists 
that "the govemment is opposed to trying any Sudanese official or ordinary citizen 
involved in the Darfiir incidents outside the Sudan" (Agence France Presse February 5, 
2005). 
In the diaspora, Sudanese watch the news bulletins and wonder about the future. Says a 
Sudanese-Australian from Darfiir: "I am Muslim more than them but we don't care about 
religion, we care about rights" (Levy 2005). However it is clear that in today's Sudan, 
being a Muslim is not enough to ensure equality as a Sudanese citizen, not enough to 
ensure govemment support if your village is attacked and your family harassed and even 
killed. 
Once again, the pattern of escalation of conflict here is clear. Low level tribal differences 
over water and grazing land may fester for years, contained by cautious local leaders and 
community restraint. But add plentiful supplies of modem weapons and manipulative 
and mmour-mongering officials who are prepared to foster ethnic differences to divide 
and mle, and it is possible to create bloodshed for our times and bittemess that may not 
subside for generations. 
The scorched earth policies carried out by the Janjaweed have another agenda - to 
disperse people fi-om their land. Again, this is the same situation as we have found in the 
south wiiere people have been forced to flee their homes in the oil areas. Government-
backed militia, manipulated along ethnic lines, displaces the local population who are 
forced to flee for their safety. 
The international uproar over the situation in Darfiir has reached a peak unlike any 
concem shown over the conflict in the south. The world community, through the UN, 
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has made it clear the JanjaweecTs activities - and their backing from the government -
are intolerable. 
But as an international watchdog, the UN Security Council lacks teeth and fails to step in 
to prevent atrocities, even when it is clear what is happening. Despite all the warnings, 
we have been witnessing another Rwanda, of sorts, and a repeat of the last 20 years in the 
Nuba Mountains and in the south. As all parties to the conflict are Sudanese Muslims, 
this time there can be no doubt that it is racism at play, rather than religion. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BEYOND NAIVASHA 
Peace in our time 
On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed a long-awaited, 
comprehensive peace agreement that covered a number of issues that are referred to as 
the protocols. The ceremony, at State House in Nairobi, was witnessed by heads of 
government from Kenya, South Africa and many other foreign dignitaries. 
Final consensus had been reached on six main protocols on December 31, 2004, at Lake 
Naivasha, the beautiful Kenyan venue that had been the site for peace talks for the past 
few years. The protocols covered self determination for the south, power sharing, 
administration arrangements for the Nuba Mountains and Southem Blue Nile, and for the 
oil-rich Abyei area, arrangements for sharing wealth - especially some 300,000 barrels a 
day of oil - and security details such as coordination and salaries for the two defence 
forces (Garang: January 1,2005, Agence France Presse: December 30, 2004). 
By late February 2005, Sudan is expected to form a government of national unity with 
decentralised administration. The SPLM will set up a semi-autonomous government of 
South Sudan, probably in the southem town of Rumbek As part of the power-sharing 
agreement, first vice president and government peace broker, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, 
must stand down in favour of SPLM leader John Garang de Mabior, who will become 
both national first vice president and head of the government of Southem Sudan. An 
SPLM appointee will replace the current foreign minister (Agence France Presse, 
December 30,2004). 
General elections must be held at the end of the third year and after six years, the south 
will vote on whether to secede or stay part of Sudan (Agence France Presse, December 
82 
30, 2004). Many observers expect a referendum to support secession, but it is also clear 
the government opposes the break up of the country. In Ashworth's view, southemers 
are very imlikely ever to see an independent southern state: "If a referendum ever takes 
place, if the government of Sudan has not succeeded in manipulating the electorate and 
rigging the ballot to guarantee victory, if the southemers vote for secession ... will they 
get it? The answer is probably not" (Ashworth 2004: 186). He argues that the African 
Union and Arab League nations, among others, would support the government's calls for 
territorial integrity "to be maintained at any cost" (Ashworth 2004:186). 
Nevertheless, the agreement provides that after three years, the Nuba Mountains and 
Southern Blue Nile vsdll elect their own government - until that date, a governor from the 
SPLM or Khartoum will rotate through the post. Abyei will have special status and 
people will be dual citizens of both Westem Kordofan in the north and Bahr A1 Ghazal in 
the south, with a referendum in six years to see where their permanent future lies (Agence 
France Presse, December 30, 2004). 
The oflScial languages will be Arabic and English. In the public service, 30 per cent of 
jobs will be reserved for people from the south. The majority of the oil wealth will be 
split equally between the national and southern governments, with two per cent 
remaining in the area where the oil is sourced. There will be a new national currency 
with a design reflecting Sudan's diversity, although whether the name of the currency 
will revert to the former 'pound' from its current 'dinar'^^ is unclear. A dual banking 
system will include a non-interest charging Islamic system in the north and a 
conventional system in the south (Agence France Presse, December 30,2004). 
Government and SPLA forces will remain separate entities but will have equal status as 
Sudan's National Armed Forces, coordinated by a new Joint Defence Board comprising 
top officers from either side. More than 100,000 government troops in the south and 
^^  Most Sudanese shops still calculate in pounds rather than the official dinars. If an item costs 2 dinars, it 
will be quoted at 200, meaning 200 pounds. The currency itself is labelled as dinars, so it is confusing for 
visitors. 
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SPLA iighters in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile will be withdrawn under 
international monitoring arrangements. 
When peace breaks out 
Although it had been 21 years in the making - or perhaps because of the longevity of the 
civil war - the agreement appears to have left people in a kind of shock, uncertain about 
what will happen next. When war has become normal, what do you do when faced with 
peace? Others argue that it cannot be called peace when the blood continues to flow in 
Darfur. 
When peace 'broke out,' southerners danced in the streets of Khartoum, while President 
Bashir visited Juba and spoke to the crowd wrapped in a southerner's lau wrapper^^ 
instead of military uniform, a safari suit or northern jellabiya. But somehow, he seemed 
uneasy draped in the white cloth, his belly circled with an unhemmed green sash that 
appeared to have been hastily added as a nod to Islam's green and white colours. 
The news wires are buzzing with stories about the temporary southern capital of Rumbek, 
how satellite dishes and mobile phones are arriving as construction starts, hi Uganda, 
long-term refugees wonder about the facilities in their homelands - should they take the 
chance and move now, or wait a little in the camps, where at least they have food, shelter 
and education, and see how things develop. 
hi Khartoum, people are nervous - their situation has improved over the years, will the 
southerners come and take everything for nothing? '^* Already, the SPLM has established 
offices in Khartoum, one in a building in the very street used by President Bashir when 
he travels to the People's Assembly, another in Haj Yousif; an area that is home to many 
southerners. Ash worth argues that "the main problem for most northemers has never 
" Lau - material tied over the shoulder and left to fall to the ground, worn by both men and women in the 
south. 
^^  From views expressed to me by a number of northern professionals, Khartoum 2004. 
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been the war in the south; rather it is living in a dictatorship which imposes its own 
version of Islam on them" (Ashworth 2004:187). 
Martin notes that "Bashir has proven to be far more resilient than anyone expected. 
Slowly his government has worked itself out of its pariah status and back from the brink 
of economic collapse" (Martin 2002: 2). In central Khartoum, public transport, 
telephones, electricity and water utilities are in much better order than a decade ago, 
while regional towns such as Kadugli, Juba and Malakal are connected to the mobile 
phone network. 
Fear of the unknown 
But the discrimination, distrust and fear that have dogged the Sudanese for so many years 
will not disappear with the stroke of a pen on a peace agreement. There is deep anxiety 
about the outcome of this war, deep seated fear from the north that the southerners will 
take jobs and resources previously only available to northerners, from the south that the 
north will attempt to subjugate them yet again. With the possibility of secession in the 
ofSng, how serious are these disparate groups about learning to cooperate and live 
together harmoniously? 
To a large extent, what we have seen to date in Sudan is outlined by Rothchild, who says: 
Ethnic and political minorities fear the consequences of a fundamental reorganisation of 
the regime (for example, the creation of an Islamic state in Sudan) and where they remain 
deeply anxious over their subordination or their cultural or physical survival, inter-group 
conflicts are likely to be intense and in some cases, highly destructive of lives and 
property (Rothchild 1997: 28). 
Johnson notes that although the SPLM stated from the outset that the war was not about 
"a southern problem, but about the distribution of power in the country," the government 
successfully confined the Inter-Govemmental Authority on Development talks to 
southern grievances (Johnson 2003: 10). He says other opposition groups have been 
absent from Naivasha, arguing "the rest of the country cannot be so easily sidelined and 
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sooner or later the broader constitutional issues are going to intrude" (Johnson 2003: 10). 
Further, he observes that Abyei, Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains are not part 
of the old south and may not aspire to inclusion in an independent southern Sudan 
(Johnson 2003: 10). 
Democracy in African states often means that the largest ethnic group takes power, 
argues Deng (Deng 1998: 11-12). It will be a struggle for the SPLM to ensure it appears 
inclusive of all groups and is not just for Dinka and other Nilotic groups. To date, the 
SPLM's rhetoric of a New Sudan that provides equal resources and opportunities for 
people from all backgrounds has not been developed beyond talk. It is inevitable that in 
the coming years, new parties promoting the cause of other areas such as Equatoria wdll 
come forward and the SPLM must be prepared to work with these groups rather than 
seeing them as usurpers of power. The National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of 
opposition groups operating outside Sudan, has been seen as SPLM-dominated. Perhaps 
that's the nature of being the group with the guns, but nevertheless, groups such as Beja 
Congress in the east may not appreciate beiag seen as poor second cousins to the SPLM 
in goverrmient. Peace provides a second chance for the SPLM to lead the way in 
developing an inclusive style of governance, but it is too early to determine if they will 
respond positively to this challenge. 
Lesch argues that 
Normal interethnic competition for political posts, educational benefits and a stake in the 
economy is distorted by the unequal power relations and the ideological pressure from 
the centre. The more the government in the north seeks to Arabise and Islamise the 
country, the more African peoples react against that pressure and deepen their counter-
identities (Lesch 1998: 213). 
Trying to persuade African non-Muslims that they are really part of the Arab and Islamic 
world only serves to set people at each other's throats. Likewise, arming neighbouring 
groups such as Nuer and Dinka, Dinka and Baggara, Rizeigat and Dinka, then inflaming 
tensions so they inevitably fight, is one of the most perverse ways one can imagine for a 
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government to deal with its citizens. Entire villages have been destroyed by this process 
- and to what end? 
Burying the hatchet 
For many of those have spent years fighting, or who have lost family and friends or 
had their own lives disrupted beyond belief, there may be little inclination to bury the 
hatchet. Peterson notes that many of the Lost Boys^^ subsequently chose to return to their 
homeland to fight: "A Catholic priest who accompanied the boys for much of the 
journey to Kenya explained a new frustration: 'Many want to go back and fight. They 
have seen their mothers and fathers killed and there is a lot of hatred among them'." 
(Peterson 2000: 243) 
Even in the diaspora, northemers and southerners may socialise separately, as Sudanese 
in Australia explained: 
It looks like we came to a multicultural country, but we still don't work together. Until 
now, we have different community associations. We tried to bring the Arabs in but it 
didn't work. Most were Muslim, but we don't want to hear Bismillah Abdel Rahman or 
prayers. The northemers feel second class here, but the southerners - they still consider 
we should be behind them - D, a Sudanese-Australian from the south (Levy 2004) 
The war is part of what is keeping us separate - we cannot have barbecues with the 
people whose brothers are killing our mothers - J, a Sudanese-Australian from the south 
(Levy 2004). 
Choosing and accepting a leader was also a problem among such disparate groups, said S, 
a Sudanese-Australian from the north, hi the case of South Afiica, other tribes agreed on 
Nelson Mandela, but S asserted Sudanese cannot agree on a leader. "Even the big parties 
like Umma, are not a party of ideas, but a party of big families. In Darfixr, people are half 
with the govemment, half with the revolution." (Levy 2005). 
^^  A group of around 12,000 unaccompanied minors/child soldiers, the Lost Boys travelled from Sudan to 
Ethiopia and back again, journeying 1000 miles over six years in atrocious conditions. 
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Don't forget Darfur 
The conflict goes on in Darfur as debate continues over the relative merits of trying 
Sudanese war criminals in the International Criminal Court in The Hague or a yet-to-be-
established tribunal in Tanzania. Debate also continues over reports of atrocities, with 
the Sudanese government flatly denying reports from non govemment organisations that 
Sudanese Antonov planes bombed Darflir villages in January, killing more than 100 
people (Associated Press January 26,2005; Associated Press February 1, 2005). 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has laid out a plan for a 10,000-strong peacekeeping 
mission to monitor the end of the war with the south and says the mission would also 
deploy observers to Darfur to work closely with African Union monitors (Associated 
Press February 4,2005). 
But peace talks m Abuja dealing with Darfur must find a recipe for ethnic balance for 
"any region in Sudan still affected by the discriminating politics of Arab and Islamisation 
supremacy," argues Pastor Enoch Mikaya Muktar (Muktar, August 28,2004: 3). He says 
that one only needs to look at the school curricula or national television to see the 
imbalance. Non-Arab ethnic groups appear only to perform traditional dances, "as if the 
only thing God created them to do is dance" (Muktar, August 28,2004: 3). 
It's time for coexistence among the ethnicities of Darftir, so that a Darfurian of an 
African ethnic group can look at the face of an Arab today without any disgusting 
feelings if he knows some of his family members are victims of Arab militiamen 
(Muktar, August 28, 2004: 3). 
Deng notes that the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement heralded a golden period for Sudan, in 
which cultural diversity began to be celebrated: 
Whether the country will once again be able to achieve, retain and improve on that 
golden period will depend on the prospects for a just resolution to the north-south 
conflict, which has proliferated and is now spreading to other marginalised non-Arab 
regions of the north (Deng 1995: 384). 
Given that the flames of war have been fanned by racism and fijelled by religion, it will 
require concerted and structured effort by the government and by religious bodies to try 
to tum the situation around. The Darflir situation must be resolved and the needs of other 
groups, such as the Beja in eastern Sudan, who clashed with police in Port Sudan (BBC 
January 29, 2005) in late January, 2005, must be addressed. 
Hope lies with the people 
Ashworth asserts that hope lies with the people, rather than with political leadership, 
which he argues is "largely discredited and holds little moral authority" (Ashworth 2004: 
188). But Sudanese in the diaspora believe it will take a lot to get people to change long-
held feelings about each other: 
I cannot imagine the northerners changing overnight to behave like good boys all of a 
sudden and the southerners would not accept anything less than the feeling of ownership 
of the country. Based on all the things we've touched on today, Sudan has been divided 
already. The onus is on the northerners: show us why it is necessary for Sudan to be one -
J, a Sudanese-Australian from the south (Levy 2004). 
Ashworth continues that civil society must be fostered so it can "play a greater part not 
only in the peace processes but also in the govemance of the country" (Ashworth 2004: 
188). A leaf could be taken out of South Africa's book, where inclusivity and 
transparency are seen as essential (Ashworth 2004: 188). 
However, the situation is different to that of South Africa, where there was a revered 
leader and elections finally brought him and his party to power. In Sudan, many 
southemers are expecting to have a separate country after the referendum in six years 
time. They are not looking to achieve rapprochement with the north, they believe the 
battle has been won and it is time to divide the spoils. Although many have been living 
in SPLM-controlled areas, they are not necessarily all sfrong supporters of Garang and 
may well be disillusioned with leaders as Ashworth indicates above. 
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Many of the people who return to Sudan will have spent large periods of time living in 
refugee camps. Although conditions in camps are tough, facilities in established camps 
may still be better than what is available in Sudan. People would be deluded if they 
expect the intemational community will pick up the bill for development work in the 
same way they funded 20 years of emergency humanitarian assistance. Aid funds in fact 
are likely to be diverted to other emergencies, with the Boxing Day tsunami a case in 
point. 
However, there are a number of initiatives that could assist in promoting reconciliation 
and peace in Sudan. Australia's efforts in recent years to promote the country's 
multicultural identity could provide a useful guide. A government-supported 
multicultural foundation could develop programs for people of all backgrounds and ages 
to raise awareness and foster peace. This could play an extremely positive role in 
bringing rapprochement at the grassroots level. Similarly, the media has a vital role to 
play in ensuring rumours are debunked and positive stories get a run. 
Otherwise, in six years, or even sooner, this bloody mess could start up again. Whatever 
the differences, whatever the background, colour or religion, there are surely better ways 
to sort them out than through yet another double-decade war. 
Conclusion 
This sub-thesis has looked at Sudan - an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse 
country that was thrown together in one large national melting pot by its colonial masters. 
The turmoil that has ensued has effectively prevented Sudan from playing a significant 
role in regional or intemational arenas. 
From the begirming, there were tensions between north and south, between Arabs and 
Africans, between Muslims, Christians and people with traditional beliefs. Echoes of the 
slave trade reverberated throughout their dealings, British attitudes cemented the sub-
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national cleavages, ensuring that they not only did not like each other, they also feared 
each other and could not work together. 
Sudan may the largest country in Africa, but the darker one's skin, the smaller one's 
chance of having a good education, good job and ability to express religious and cultural 
values. The Arab Muslims from the northern riverain have traditionally had the upper 
hand and access to the most resources. Northern Sudanese as a group regard themselves 
as "The Sudanese" and everyone else as "The Others." 
A succession of poor leaders, both civilian and military, has failed to inspire the 
population to rise above their prejudices in the style of a Mandela or a Gandhi, histead, 
even those who showed some promise at times, such as Nimeiri during his early peace-
making period, eventually moved down the Islamist path. There has been a complete 
inability of the part of Northern Muslim leaders to shape a brighter future for the nation 
by demonstrating the ability of Islam in Sudan to create peace and accommodate other 
beliefs. Bashir and Turabi are both educated men, yet they have failed to develop plans 
to bring the country together, instead adopting militant positions that show a lack of faith 
in the rightness of their Islamist cause and a complete lack of vision when it comes to 
governing the country. 
The verdict on the leadership of SPLM chair John Garang may still be out. While he has 
put forward a vision for a New Sudan, his leadership style has also been under fire fi-om 
people inside and outside the movement and it remains to be seen whether he will take a 
more inclusive approach as head of the government of South Sudan and as national first 
vice president. Clearly the opportunity is there, if he wants to take it. 
To study the history of Sudan, both before and after independence, is to trawl through 
some of the most disgusting examples of human rights abuse that can be found anywhere. 
Slaveiy, torture, child soldiers, massacres, buming of houses, incarceration, beatings -
the list is endless. The legacy of psychological traumas will affect family and society 
relationships for years to come. 
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The prospects for reconciliation are dim. All the indications are that the south is ready to 
separate. Much of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei area may also 
want to distance themselves from Khartoum. Culturally, physically, economically, the 
African parts of Sudan have been insulted by the ruling elite one too many times. 
Just a few hours by plane from Sudan there are countries where it is considered normal to 
be black and African, where advertising billboards show smiling African faces, where 
dress styles are modest but relaxed, alcohol is available and men and women work 
together and play together without fear of retribution. Many southerners have been 
enjoying this lifestyle in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia while they have been in exile -
they may return to Sudan, but they won't be giving up that African way of life. 
And there will be Sudanese from the north who will retum to Khartoum in the wake of 
the peace agreement, Muslim Sudanese who found it difficult to work and dangerous to 
express their political opinions in years gone by. They've been living in African 
countries, but also in Egypt, Europe, the United States and Australia. They remember a 
Sudan where shaha was a respected part of the legal process, but not seen as the 
repository for the main body of the country's law. 
There is one clear indication the north - or at least Bashir - continues to view the south, 
the non-Muslim Sudanese, as unequal partners. At a gathering at Suki in central Sudan 
on February 9, President Bashir told the crowd that Islam would continue to be the main 
source of legislation in Sudan, despite the peace deal. AFP reports that Bashir told the 
crowd Sudan's former leaders paid only lip service to sharia, comparing his government 
to the Mahdist revolution, v\iiich Bashir said "raised the banner of Islam and 
implemented its code in public life" (AFP February 9,2005). 
In my view, the next few years will see great development in the Sudan, particularly in 
the south which has lagged behind for so long. I believe it is also inevitable there will be 
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sporadic outbreaks of fighting in rural areas between ethnic groups, some of whom will 
sport government-supplied guns. 
At present, one would expect a referendum to support separation for the south, but how 
this could be achieved in reality is uncertain. One thing is clear however, that by 
allowing racist views and attitudes to spread into the very febric of their society, the 
Sudanese have done themselves a great disservice. The rich cultural mix of the country 
makes it one of the most vibrant nations on earth. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TIMELINE^^ 
Middle Ages: Christian kingdoms along the Nile coexist with Muslim neighbours. 
End of Middle Ages: Collapse of Christian kingdoms, rise of Funj Sultanate. 
17' century: Emergence of Sultanate ofDarfur. 
1821: Turko-Egyptian conquest of Sudan 'unifies' small independent Sudanese states. 
1885: Mahdist forces (of Mohamed Ahmed 'A1 Mahdi') capture Khartoum after a long 
siege, including killing British General Charles Gordon. 
1885: A1 Mahdi dies, Khalifa Abdullahi takes over. 
1892: Belgians capture Western Equatoria up to Mongalla. The Lado enclave becomes 
part of the Belgian Congo. French occupy parts of Bahr A1 Ghazal and Upper Nile. 
1896: Belgians agree to release Lado Enclave to British after Belgian King Leopold dies. 
1898: Anglo-Egyptian forces led by General Kitchener overthrow the Mahdist state. 
1899: Condominium agreement signed. French withdraw. 
1900-1920s: 'Pacification' of the country, frequently characterised by violence. 
1930: Southern Policy is introduced secretly to isolate the south culturally and 
linguistically from the north. 
1930s-1940s: Nationalist sentiments develop rapidly in the north. 
1947: Juba Conference organised by colonial govemment. Southern chiefs agree with 
northem nationalists to pursue a united Sudan. A crash program of integration follows. 
1953: Self-rule is introduced. In the south, Sudanisation is seen as northemisation. 
1955: In Equatoria, the Torit mutiny of southern soldiers refusing transfer to the north 
marks the beginning of the first civil war. Massacres of northem administrators, teachers 
and traders in the south. 
1956: Independence on January 1. Ismail A1 Azhari is first Prime Minister of national 
govemment formed of Unionist and Umma parties. 
1958: Military takeover by General Abboud, political parties dissolved, state of 
emergency introduced. 
1962: Sustained guerrilla war develops with Anyanya in the south. 
1964: Abboud steps up military action in the south, thousands of southemers flee to 
neighbouring countries. 
Oct 1964: General strike and popular uprising bring down govemment, transitional 
civilian govemment installed. 
March 1965: Round Table Conference on the 'southem problem' attended by most 
parties from south and north. 
Sources include: 
BBC News Timeline: Sudan, http://bbc.co.uk, 2005 
Verney, Peter et al Sudan: Conflict and minorities, Britain: Minority Rights Group, 1995 
Woodward, Peter Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990 
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1965: Elections held, Umma's Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub is new Prime Minister 
1966-7: Umma's Sadiq A1 Mahdi is Prime Minister for ten months. 
1967: Sudan sides with Arab worid, declares war on Israel, breaks ties with the United 
States, looks to the Soviet Union for support. 
May 1969: Colonel Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri takes power with leftist and communist 
support. 
1970: Joseph Lagu becomes sole leader of Anyanya guerrillas. 
July 1971: Nimieri survives brief communist coup, purges leftists from army and 
government. 
1972: Relations improve with US and the West. 
March 1972: Addis Ababa Agreement ends first civil war. 
1973: Sudan's first permanent constitution proclaimed. 
1973: Large scale Sudanese migration to Gulf states for work. 
1978: Oil is discovered by Chevron at Bentiu in the south. 
1979: With fall of Uganda's Idi Amin, many well qualified Equatorians return to south, 
shifting balance of power away from Dinka and Nuer. 
May 1983: South divided into three regions and single regional government abolished, 
thus abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
May 1983: Bor garrison mutinies. Colonel John Garang de Mabior later forms SPLM/A 
September 1983: Nimeiri introduces sharia or September laws. 
1984-5: Severe femine in west and east of Sudan following years without adequate rain. 
April 1985: Strikes and demonstrations lead to overthrow of Nimieri by his chief-of-
staflF, General Abdel Rahman Sowar A1 Dahab. Transitional Military Council installed. 
1985: SPLA incursion into Nuba Mountains. 100 Baggara Arabs killed, government 
begins supplying arms to Baggara. 
March 1986: Koka Dam Agreement in Ethiopia produces peace formula supported by 
Umma, rejected by Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and National Islamic Front (NIF). 
April 1986: Elections - Sadiq AI Mahdi becomes Prime Minister of coalition 
Umma/DUP government, half of south unable to vote due to insecurity. 
1987: Koka Dam Agreement abandoned by Al Mahdi, state of emergency declared, 
government campaigns begin to force displaced southerners out of Khartoum. 
1987: SPLA starts a unit in the Nuba Mountains. 
March 1987: Ed Dhein massacre - more than 1000 Dinka killed by Rizeigat Arabs, 
including many burnt alive in railway carriages. Reports of slavery of southemers. 
1988: Famine in Southern Sudan, 250,000 die from hunger-related diseases. 
Government, militia and SPLA scorched earth and relief denial policies are primary 
cause of food shortages, compounded by drought, flood and pest infestations. 
March 1989: Sadiq Al Mahdi begins peace talks with SPLM, ceasefire announced, UN 
Operation Lifeline Sudan established to bring famine relief to the South. 
June 1989: Lt-Gen Hassan Omer Al Bashir takes power with covert NIF support. All 
political parties banned. 
October 1989: SPL A/Khartoum ceasefire breaks down, National Democratic Alliance 
formed fi-om north/south parties including Umma, DUP, Communists and later, SPLM. 
December 1990: Bashir announces immediate implementation of sharia in north. 
May 1991: 500,000 southem reftigees fleemg to Sudan from Ethiopian camps after fall 
of Mengistu are bombed by Sudanese air force. 
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August 1991: Split in SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol form breakaway SPLA-United. 
September 1991: Malnutrition increases, especially in west, tens of thousands die. 
October 1991: Government seals off Nuba Mountains, attempts to drive out Nuba and 
destroy SPLA in the area. 
November 1991: 200,000 Dinka flee Bor after 5000 massacred by SPLA-United. 
January 1992: Mass protests in Khartoum after 16 killed when displaced people's homes 
bulldozed by government. 
February 1992: 300-member Transitional National Assembly appointed. 
June 1992: Thousands of Nuba forcibly relocated to 'peace villages' by the government. 
December 1992: UN General Assembly condemns Bashir government for gross 
violations of human rights. 
1993: Peace talks collapse at Abuja, 100,000 southerners flee to Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Congo in August after government offensive against SPLA in Equatoria. 
1993: US adds Sudan to lists of states sponsoring terrorists. 
1993: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya establish committee to resolve war under 
umbrella of Inter-Govemmental Authority on Drought and Development. 
July 1994: 50,000 people expelled from Khartoum in two weeks of night raids. 
August 1994: Beja Congress in Cairo reports government terrorising the east. 
1996: US lists Sudan as terrorist sponsor again, bans financial transactions. 
1996: Osama Bin Laden expelled from Sudan, at American urging. 
1997: Riek Machar and Southem Sudan hidependence Movement sign peace agreement 
with the Khartoum government. 
May 1998: Construction begins of 1610 km oil pipeline linking Heglig oilfield in 
Kordofan with terminal on Red Sea coast. 
August 1998: US missile attack on Khartoum's El Shifa chemical plant. 
AprU 1999: Pipeline ready, refinery to process 2.5m tonnes of crude oil per year. 
1999: Sudan and Uganda agree to stop supporting rebels on each other's territory -
Lord's Resistance Army and SPLM. 
1999: Bashir dissolves the National Assembly, declares state of emergency, following 
power struggle vsdth parliamentary speaker Hassan A1 Turabi. 
2000: Governor of Khartoum decrees women barred from working in public places. 
December 2000: Bashir re-elected for another five years in elections boycotted by main 
opposition parties. 
February 2001: Turabi arrested a day after his Popular National Congress party signs a 
memorandum of understanding with SPLM. 
March 2001: UN World Food Programme struggles to raise fimds to feed three million 
people facing famine. 
November 2001: US extends sanctions against Sudan for another year. 
January 2002: Govemment and SPLM sign landmark renewable ceasefire agreement for 
Nuba Mountains, a key SPLM stronghold. 
July 20,2002: Govemment and SPLM sign Machakos Protocol. Govemment accepts 
rights of south to seek self determination after six year interim period. Southem rebels 
accept application of sharia in north. 
July 27,2002: Bashir and Garang meet for the first time in Kampala through mediation 
of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. 
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October 2002: Government and SPLM agree on a ceasefire during negotiations, but 
fighting continues. 
February 2003: Darflir rebels rise against government, claiming region is neglected. 
January 2004: Army moves to quell uprising in Darfiir, thousands flee to Chad. 
March 2004: Intemational outrage over Darfur raids hy Janjaweed militia. 
May 2004: Government and SPLM sign major peace protocols in Naivasha, Kenya. 
November 2004: UN Security Council holds meeting on Sudan in Nairobi. 
January 9, 2005: Sudan government and SPLM sign final peace deal in Nairobi, Garang 
to replace Ali Osman Mohamed Taha as first vice president, fighting continues in Darfijr. 
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GEOGRAPHICAL MAP OF SUDAN 
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APPENDIX 3 
ETHNOGRAPHICAL MAP OF SUDAN 
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APPENDIX 4 
SOUTH CENTRAL SUDAN - MAP OF ACTIVE OILFIELDS o o 
Source: Peter Verney - Raising the Slakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan: A Sudan Update Report, Hebden Bridge: Sudan Update, 1999: 2 
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